

# **Biblical Military Ethics and the Israel Defence Forces: the case of Special Reconnaissance**

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The deployment of special forces in hostile or politically volatile environments in search of strategic/operational intelligence, though not a 21st century novelty, appeared as a distinct military activity in literature only in the early 2000s under the label 'Special Reconnaissance' (SR). This article argues that the concept of SR (a) originated in the biblical Israelite military tradition and is depicted in the Bible as the *lapis angularis* of military strategy and a practice capable of dictating military and political norms; (b) has been used as a key element of the Israel Defence Forces' (IDF) *modus operandi* since 1948 thenceforth functioning in an analogous manner. To support these arguments, the theoretical and practical characteristics of Moses' intelligence mission to Canaan as well as the IDF's proclivity to SR are scrutinized under the general theoretical framework of political realism that assumes rational and pro-state interest course of actions. Accordingly, SR emerges as a distinctive common instrument of biblical and contemporary Israeli strategy, a fact that underlines the uninterrupted socio-political and cultural links between the past and the present of the Israeli ontology, this time via the wider concept of the Israeli military ethics.

*Keywords: Bible; IDF; military ethics; Israel; Israeli military strategy, special operations, special reconnaissance, military intelligence, strategic intelligence, operational intelligence.*

### **Introduction:**

This article examines the theoretical and empirical link between biblical and contemporary Israeli military ethics with a view to arguing that the socio-political status and the cultural connection between the past and the present of a group of people sharing the same values, beliefs and ethics may be also scrutinized through the study of military ethics in general and strategic practices in particular that had been developed within that group. By way of doing so, it focuses on the military practice of Special

Reconnaissance (SR) and sets the following two objectives: (a) to demonstrate that the origins of SR operations can be found in the biblical Israelite military practices as depicted in the Bible (Tanakh); and (b) to argue that the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) are frequently applying SR practices, showing their theoretical and empirical connection with their biblical past.

The actual term Special Reconnaissance (SR) was initially introduced by the US Army in its military field manuals in 1993 so as to theoretically frame the practice of Special Operations' (SOs) deployment in hostile, or politically sensitive environments in search of intelligence.<sup>1</sup> It must be emphasized that strategic theory acknowledges three distinctive types of intelligence: the strategic — 'required for the formulation of policy, military planning and the provision of indications and warnings at the national and/or international levels';<sup>2</sup> the operational — 'required for the planning and conduct of campaigns at the operational level';<sup>3</sup> and the tactical, which is 'required for the planning and execution of operations at the tactical level'.<sup>4</sup> Correspondingly, at the strategic level 'a nation determines national security objectives and deploys national, including military, resources to achieve them';<sup>5</sup> at the operational level 'campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations';<sup>6</sup> and at the tactical level specific 'activities, battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical formations and units'.<sup>7</sup>

In 1993, when the SR term was introduced by the US Army, no apparent distinction was made between that and the one of Special Operations with regard to the particular type of intelligence these required. However, in 2001 it was made clear that SR is meant to provide exclusively strategic/operational level intelligence.<sup>8</sup> The most

recent and comprehensive approach to the term was issued in 2018 defining SR as a synthesis of

reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or diplomatically and/or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces. S.R may include information on activities of an actual or potential enemy or secure data on the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. S.R may also include assessment of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear or environmental hazards in a denied area. SR includes target acquisition, area assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance.<sup>9</sup>

The above specification has been selected as the most appropriate terminology to describe the conceptual foundations of Special Reconnaissance and hence to distinguish it from reconnaissance operations that are mainly associated with tactical-intelligence collection. In addition, NATO and Russia define 'Special Surveillance and Reconnaissance' as 'reconnaissance and surveillance activities conducted by special-operations forces, which complement theatre intelligence assets and systems by obtaining strategic/operational information'.<sup>10</sup> The British Army has been formally using the term 'Special Reconnaissance' since the early 2000s when the Special Reconnaissance Regiment (SR.R) was established as a unit of the British special forces.<sup>11</sup> The Swedish Army uses the same term with the US and the British and identifies it as a distinctive military core activity conducted by the Special Operations Group.<sup>12</sup> Furthermore, the People's Liberation Army employs the term Special Reconnaissance including all types of intelligence-seeking SOs and not only strategic/operational activities.<sup>13</sup> Due to the restricted access to the IDF's doctrinal documents it is uncertain whether the Israeli army is officially using the term SR *per se*. Yet the practice itself is easily traceable in the IDF's philosophy as, for example, in the

description of the Sayeret Matkal's — Israel's elite special forces unit — operational duties: 'First and foremost a field intelligence-gathering unit, conducting deep reconnaissance behind enemy lines to obtain strategic intelligence' (as in the IDF's website).

Our methodology is based on a three-step approach. First, a brief historical overview regarding SR is carried out so as to trace the chronological roots of the practice. Second, the details of Moses' intelligence operation in Canaan are examined to assess to what extent SR had been a part of the biblical Israelite military practice. The first two steps would assist in demonstrating the centrality of the Bible on the conceptual development of SR. Third, the employment of SR practices by the IDF is investigated so as to demonstrate conceptual similarities between the present and the past. The methodological approach unfolds within the general theoretical framework of the traditional paradigm that assumes that states are rational actors.<sup>14</sup> Thus, political actions, in a purely Machiavellian mode, are considered exclusively interest-motivated, free of moral or religious principles. The parameter of rationality in international politics, in particular, relates to the assumption that states 'make purposive decisions that take reasonable account of their interests, and the international constraints and opportunities that they face'.<sup>15</sup> Many International Relations scholars have elaborated accordingly, as for example Martin Wight,<sup>16</sup> Ralph Pettman,<sup>17</sup> or Hedley Bull.<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless, John Mearsheimer's approach skilfully sums up all the important elements of the term:

to assume that states are rational is to say that they are aware of their external environment and they think intelligently about how to maximize their prospects for survival. In particular, they try to gauge the preferences of other states and how their own behaviour is likely to affect the actions of those other states, as well as how the behaviour of those other states is likely to affect their own strategy. When

they look at the different strategies that they have to choose between, they assess the likelihood of success as well as the costs and benefits of each one. Finally, states pay attention not only to the immediate consequences of their actions, but to the long-term effects as well.<sup>19</sup>

The chosen framework of political realism generates the following theoretical results for this particular study. First, the Israelites immediately after the Exodus from Egypt are considered an adept regional actor capable of rational decision-making and efficient operating. Second, the metaphysical involvement has not been taken into account, despite the fact that we are fully aware that the Bible is primarily, though not solely, a collection of religious texts; hence, the Israelites' attempt to conquer Canaan, as well as their strategic choices, is evaluated as a purely political event.

In pursuing the objectives of this study, we are committed to frequent reference to the biblical narrative.<sup>20</sup> In doing so, we consider the Bible as a primary research source and no judgement is passed on the historical accuracy of the events described therein since our analysis is neither historiographical nor religious.

### **An Introduction to the concept of SOs**

Special Operations are mostly associated with images of greased-faced soldiers launching surprise attacks against the enemy's centre of gravity, aiming at either ending hostilities in one blow or achieving decisive damages.<sup>21</sup> Bibliography refers to such moves as 'direct actions'.<sup>22</sup> However, most SOs' definitions adopted by official military authorities do not restrict such activity to strictly violent implementations. NATO, for example, defines SOs as 'military activities conducted by specially designated, organized, trained and equipped forces using distinct techniques and modes of employment'.<sup>23</sup> The EU Military Committee (EUMC) maintains NATO's broad approach and places emphasis on the mode of action which is 'not standard to

conventional forces'.<sup>24</sup> Furthermore, it argues that

these activities may be conducted across the full range of military operations independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces to achieve political, military, psychological and economic objectives.<sup>25</sup>

Along the same lines — with particular emphasis on the mode of deployment — the US Department of Defence defines SOs as those activities as

requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment and training, often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and characterized by one or more of the following: time-sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk.<sup>26</sup>

The most inclusive definition that enfolds all of the above and also clearly underlines the capacity of SOs to manifest both in violent as well as in non-violent forms is provided by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (USJCS):

[SOs are] conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations often require covert, clandestine, or low-visibility capabilities. S.Os differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. The successful conduct of S.Os relies on individual and small unit proficiency in a multitude of specialized, often non-conventional combat skills applied with adaptability, improvisation, innovation, and self-reliance.<sup>27</sup>

As it becomes evident, it is not violence *per se* that dictates SOs. Both violent and non-violent actions that are implemented by military forces may equally be included in the contemporary framework of SOs given that they bear certain characteristics that classify these actions as non-conventional: (a) SOs are dictated by an economy of scale

rationale; that is, a small force is mobilised to achieve greater goals with the less possible economic cost.<sup>28</sup> (b) SOs bear a clandestine character and involve covert military activities.<sup>29</sup> (c) the human factor holds a prominent role in SOs since 'it is the operator who makes it possible to perform...in a high-risk environment'.<sup>30</sup> (d) high political and physical risks are involved in SOs.<sup>31</sup> (e) SOs are deployed to achieve pivotal political and military objectives covering the whole range between the strategic and the tactical levels.<sup>32</sup> (f) SOs may take place anywhere, and they need no supply lines during their execution while there is no need for an official declaration of war between states in order for a SO to occur against one or all of them.<sup>33</sup> Overall, SOs are characterized by 'an increasing sense of the rewards of quality and thought over heavy mass action that offer an unprecedented strategic advantage to those armies who successfully plan and implement such activities.'<sup>34</sup>

The USJCS approach to SOs, as presented above, assists in theoretically clarifying the concept even further. In particular, the USJCS definition is structured in such a way that it aids in surpassing an important theoretical obstacle, directly linked to our analysis, that is summed-up in the following question: since special forces, as a standing force capability, became available only since WWII — as the common scholarly view dictates<sup>35</sup> — and are associated with technological military advancements (weaponry, means of transportation, communications, etc.), is it theoretically sound to seek for SOs prior to WWII, let alone in biblical antiquity? These sorts of queries are not at all uncommon when theoretical and practical links are being sought for among military practices of the classical strategy era and that of modern — the latter being mainly shaped as a separate epoch by technology itself. However, the USJCS' conceptualisation of the term, via arguing that it is only 'the successful conduct of SOs' that relies on specialisation and, therefore, not the concept of SOs *per se*, it



carefully disengages special forces from the wider discussion. As Derek Leebaert concludes, investigating the roots of SOs 'from Achilles to Al Qaeda', SOs are about pulling-off the 'rare or unprecedented' using a bunch of 'picked men' that may or may not have a specific talent or training.<sup>36</sup> In that perspective, SOs are traceable independently of special forces throughout the history of mankind, from the scouts of ancient Egypt and the warriors lurking inside the Trojan Horse to modern special operatives of counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism. It is in this wider conceptual manner that the term SO is used herein and facilitates comparisons between biblical and contemporary practices.

### **A brief historical overview of SR**

The practice of intelligence-gathering originated in the Ancient Near-East when the Egyptians' need for large-scale geopolitical expansion (around 1525BCA) necessitated the establishment of the first covert intelligence networks.<sup>37</sup> When it comes, in particular, to the use of SOs as tailor-made intelligence-gathering practices, rigorous attention is needed so as not to classify typical reconnaissance operations as SR. Hence, prior to tracing the historical footprints of SR, we consider useful to primarily clarify that SR should not be confused with covert tactical-intelligence seeking activities that are performed by ground troops in wartime and their mode of deployment may fit the general description of SOs as clarified above — clandestine, flexible, high-risk missions; these tactical-intelligence orientated operations fall within the contemporary theoretical boundaries of reconnaissance defined as military activity

undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy; or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.<sup>38</sup>

Although the above definition seems rather vague, and one could argue that it may as well include SR, it must be noted that the concept of reconnaissance exclusively relates to 'gaining and maintaining contact with the enemy' as a catalyst to winning a battle or launching a successful attack;<sup>39</sup> therefore, reconnaissance is concerned with tactical-level intelligence of a very specific battlefield and overlooks strategic/operational objectives and footprints. This means that SR, being strategic/operational-orientated, is automatically excluded from this theoretical framework. Naturally, reconnaissance operations are 'commander-orientated and commander-directed' activities and, therefore, contrary to SR, they do not require clearance from the highest levels of the political/military echelon.<sup>40</sup> Such tactical intelligence-collection activities have been rather common since antiquity. One of the earliest examples, in the form of covert battlefield scouting so as to spy on the enemy strengths, whereabouts, formations, etc., is recorded in the Asiatic Wars (1274BCE) between the Egyptians and the Hittites when two Hittite scouts are arrested by an equivalent Egyptian operative while spying — obviously from a distance — on the Egyptian military camp.<sup>41</sup> Similar covert scouting cases are reported in numerous other occasions such as in Homer's Iliad (8th century BCE);<sup>42</sup> in the Peloponnesian War;<sup>43</sup> in Xenophon's Anabasis (370BCE) scouting teams ('οι προπεμθέντες σκοποί', the vanguard) were used to provide tactical intelligence;<sup>44</sup> Vegetius mentions of Roman scouts operating even at night to ensure coverage;<sup>45</sup> many Byzantine Emperors incorporated scouts in covert intelligence-seeking operations to obtain tactical intelligence deep inside enemy territory;<sup>46</sup> Napoleon also used them extensively to collect tactical information, etc.<sup>47</sup> The practice progressively reduced during WWI and afterwards due to (a) the rapid development of telecommunications that dominated the field intelligence;<sup>48</sup> and (b) the introduction of air-force that took over most tactical intelligence-collection missions.<sup>49</sup> Nevertheless, it still thrives in

modern battlefields.<sup>50</sup>

On the other hand, SR is a distinctive SO activity that exclusively focuses on strategic/operational intelligence-seeking. Contrary to the practice of reconnaissance, a similarly lucid historical development path for SR is not evident despite the fact that, as it will be presented in the following paragraphs, the first SR case can be found in the Tanakh. After the biblical Israelites, the practice re-emerged in WWII and thenceforth, however it appeared sporadically and mostly during wartimes. For example, Anders Westberg reports that the successful Norwegian special forces' raid on the hydroelectric plant at Vemork (Norway) — a facility that supported the secret nuclear weapons development programme of Nazi Germany — was the aftermath of months of strategic/operational intelligence-collection activities provided by various sources including SOs.<sup>51</sup> The British SAS also carried out SR in Normandy monitoring German logistics for several consecutive weeks prior to D-Day.<sup>52</sup> SR activities occurred immediately after the end of the War and especially the first period of the Cold War.<sup>53</sup> In 1950, the Soviets had found the Spetsnaz-GRU (military intelligence special forces) so as to develop, among others, strategic intelligence-collection capabilities via SOs' deployment at the outbreak of the Korean war.<sup>54</sup> Egyptian special operators carried out strategic-intelligence SOs inside Israel in the early 1950s.<sup>55</sup> Analogous practices are reported taking place in the Falklands in 1982 and the Gulf war in 1990.<sup>56</sup> The US employed SR in a noticeable frequency only after 9/11;<sup>57</sup> the latter is most certainly linked to the fact that the 2001 terrorist act underlined the need for the US to 'build better, more integrated intelligence capabilities to provide timely, accurate information on threats, wherever they may emerge'.<sup>58</sup> Evidently, upon its (re)appearance in the 20th century, SR has been assigned to special forces, a stance that is mainly associated with technological advancements that acted in a twofold manner: first, they provided

additional means to perform such high-risk missions, and second, they rendered modern security threats extremely complex, hence requiring specially trained operatives to access otherwise 'unobtainable intelligence' — a representative example of such a complicated intelligence-retrieving case is presented below and relates to the acquirement of soil samples from the Syria's nuclear reactor site perimeter by Israeli Sayeret operatives.<sup>59</sup> As in all contemporary cases of special operations deployment, SR activities require approval exclusively from the highest political authorities, for example the President himself or the Secretary of Defence.<sup>60</sup>

Overall, with no mention of Moses' intelligence operation in Canaan whatsoever, bibliography concludes that (a) SR is a contemporary practice that appears — though infrequently — during and past WWII; (b) SR should not be confused with other covert reconnaissance operations that may also be deployed in a special operations' mode since the two are conceptually different practices: the focus of reconnaissance is tactical, while that of SR is strategic/operational. Consequently, what qualifies an intelligence-SO as SR, other than the special mode of deployment, is the strategic/operational orientation of the data being sought for. As the Russian General Sergei Breslavskii argues, SR's 'customer' is none other than the national leadership itself.<sup>61</sup>

Despite the fact that SR cases can be found in contemporary bibliography and practice and they are not an Israeli exclusivity, what distinguishes the IDF from the armed forces of other states, as shall be demonstrated in the following pages, is the fact that the IDF has made these operations part of its *modus operandi* even since its early days; accordingly, the IDF has been continuously employing SR operations on a regular basis in war times and in peace, rather than resorting to them sporadically and only during conflict, as is the case with most of the aforementioned examples. In support of

this argument, Anders Westberg concludes that the concept of SR qualifies as a 'lost art' and an understudied field overall, mainly due to the fact that intelligence-gathering via technological means has become the epicentre of both academic and operational attention.<sup>62</sup> Nevertheless, with current threats and challenges becoming increasingly irregular and not exclusively state-orientated, SR actions are expected to rise considerably in the near future.<sup>63</sup> After all, the Israeli example in having to face various acts of terror against citizens or infrastructure indicates that technical superiority is not a panacea for deterring or preventing terrorists.<sup>64</sup>

### **SR and Biblical Israelites**

Moses' pre-conflict military *primum actum* after the departure from Sinai, heading towards Canaan, involved the assignment of 12 Israelites to enter and gather intelligence on the entire region of Canaan. The mission lasted for more than a month and is described in the Tanakh as follows:

So Moses, by the Lord's command, sent them out from the wilderness of Paran, all the [twelve picked] men being leaders of the Israelites. And these were their names...he said to them: 'Go up there into the Negeb and on into the hill country, and see what kind of country it is. Are the people who dwell in it strong or weak, few or many? Are the towns they live in open or fortified? Is the soil rich or poor? Is it wooded or not? And take pains to bring back some of the fruit of the land'...At the end of forty days they returned...They went straight to Moses and Aaron and the whole Israelite community...and they made their report to them and the whole community, and they showed them the fruit of the land...'We came to the land you sent us to; it does indeed flow with milk and honey... However, the people who inhabit the country are powerful, and the cities are fortified and very large'.<sup>65</sup>

So, why this biblical intelligence mission may qualify as an early case of SR? To give an answer to the above question we must analyse the military character of the mission itself, the mode of deployment during the whole operation, as well as its

strategic/operational *raison d'etre*.

Although various analysts argue whether this biblical operation can be categorised as either civilian or military, we share the same view with those who argue in favour of the military character of the mission. For example, Philo Judaeus (aka Philo) refers to Moses as a military commander and considers his operation as a military practice.<sup>66</sup> Richard Gabriel frames the action in military terms arguing that 'The General' prepares for the invasion of Canaan 'in sound military fashion by ordering a thorough reconnaissance of the objective'.<sup>67</sup> Martin Sicker characterizes the operation as an 'intelligence-gathering mission' that assesses the 'military situation' in Canaan.<sup>68</sup> Carlo Serrano argues that it is a clear-cut case of a covert operation carried out by 'ancient special operators'.<sup>69</sup> The Bible itself also provides evidence, yet indirect, in favour of the military character of the operation. Accordingly, it can be derived from the narrative that the Israelis did not perceive the control of Canaan merely as a God's offering, but as an endeavour that will generate conflict; hence, before entering Canaan, they prepared for war by meticulously organising their army. In particular, while in Sinai, a military census was carried out that exclusively included those men 'from the age of twenty years up, all those who are able to bare arms' and none other;<sup>70</sup> thus, twelve divisions were created — one for each tribe — and their leaders were appointed.<sup>71</sup> From that moment on, these units were using different banners [probably to facilitate a distinctive appearance in the battlefield or while they were marching] while they camp and march in specific order.<sup>72</sup> The Bible refers to those men regularly in the interval between the Sinai recount and the intelligence operation,<sup>73</sup> in all of these occasions, these groups of men are addressed either as *מַחֲנֵה* (mahane, militia) or as *צָבָא* (tsava, army), and their leaders either as *אִישׁוֹ* (nasi, captains/leaders/princes/chieftains), *וְאֵלֵּי צָבָאֵי לְעֵן* (al tsavao, i.e. those on top of the army) s

this type of structure is much closer to fighting divisions than a mere process of civilians. Therefore, it can be easily argued that when Moses chose the twelve operatives to execute the intelligence mission, he in fact picked prominent military officers and not civilians or others — all the picked men being chieftains among the Israelites.<sup>75</sup> On that basis, the operation can be considered as a military operation. On top of that, someone can easily comprehend that an operation which involved just 12 men infiltrating an alien territory with no logistics support to collect information about the enemy — regarding its capacity to withstand an Israelites' military endeavour — must be clearly seen as an intelligence SO case. Thus, we share the view of Carlo Serrano who sees Moses' chosen twelve as 'ancient special operators...on a covert operation behind enemy lines to reconnoitre the Promised Land'.<sup>76</sup>

Yet, in order to justify an SR case in particular, the strategic/operational element of the intelligence SO needs to be established. The matter is straight-forward since the Bible clarifies that Moses' operation is different to a typical tactical-intelligence orientated activity of antiquity; indeed, the narrative reports that during the 40 days of the mission the operatives scanned a vast geographical area stretching from the south of the Dead Sea up to the Sea of Galilee.<sup>77</sup> The report of the twelve men was thorough, mainly focusing on getting to know the enemy instead of just discovering paths to unleash an attack, hence revealing the operational orientation of the intelligence mission.<sup>78</sup> The latter, combined with the SO mode of employment, allow us to enrich our argument that Moses' intelligence operation in Canaan is in fact an early SR case. Being the primary military act of the Israelites after the arrangement of the army in Sinai, to be able to meet the demands of entering in Canaan, the SR emerges as the cornerstone of the ancient Israeli military strategy.

It is very interesting to note that besides the operational aspect of the mission, the Israelites showed a vivid interest in collecting — via the SO — every source of information regarding the economic prospects that Canaan presented for them. Philo, for instance, argues that after the selection of the 12 operatives, Moses addressed the men emphasizing that above all 'it is indispensable to understand the nature of the country [Canaan], and whether it is a good land or not; for to encounter voluntary dangers for a poor and bad land is an act of folly'.<sup>79</sup> In essence, Philo suggests that the decision regarding the control of Canaan was not written on stone but was a product of a rational evaluation of the political and economic prospects that the control of Canaan was presenting for Moses and his people. Stefano Musco agrees with this rational stance since he presents Moses as a typical case of a rational leader expecting to receive 'information from his agents in order to analyse it with his closest advisors and develop a strategy'.<sup>80</sup> Richard Gabriel concurs with this view and concludes that Moses' final decision not to authorize an invasion should be attributed to the rational assessment of the collected information that strongly suggested that 'the Israelite army was not yet ready for a full-scale campaign against the more militarily sophisticated Canaanite armies'.<sup>81</sup> Howard Curzer reaches similar conclusions arguing that

after the ten spies describe the enemy's enormous military strength and the Israelites seem daunted, Moses actually urges the Israelites not to invade. Of course, Moses gives a completely different rationale; he says that he is postponing the invasion because God is angry at the Israelites for initially balking. Whatever his reasons, Moses makes the majority view of the intelligence agency public from the first, and he revises his invasion plan to accommodate the information presented.<sup>82</sup>

The narrative itself, though not straightforwardly, points towards similar conclusions since Moses' final decision not to authorise an open confrontation with the Canaanite



army is presented as a function of two factors — leaving aside the intense supernatural intervention: (a) the SR findings and the recommendation of the majority of the operatives who argued that 'we cannot attack that people, for it is stronger than we' — two out of the 12 argued in favour of an invasion on purely religious grounds;<sup>83</sup> and (b) Moses' attempt to appease a political stasis initiated after the public deliberation that followed the spies' report — the crowd threatened to stone the two operatives who argued in favour of the invasion as well as Moses himself.<sup>84</sup> The dominance of the first factor in Moses' decision-making is underlined by the fact that the biblical chieftain insisted on his decision not to authorize the invasion despite the fact that he eventually managed to successfully appease the crowd.<sup>85</sup> Overall, it is rather obvious that Moses' intelligence SO not only extends out of the operational level, by satisfying at the same time the need to obtain strategic intelligence, but emerges as a military practice capable of shaping political and not strictly military *modus operandis* in a normative manner; the latter being true considering that the SR operation was not only the first, but also the single [authorised] military action after marching from Sinai — and for the next 40 years — that governed the fate of the political objective. In contemporary strategy terms, SR emerges from the Tanakh as an imperative tool to determine what Colin Dueck frames as 'strategic adjustment': minor or major alternations with regard to a nation's 'overall strategic capabilities and commitments'.<sup>86</sup> Dueck introduces two categories of such adjustments: first-order changes that constitute major alterations with regard to the specific political ends being pursued; and second-order changes that refer to amendments that do not change the desired ends, but only the combination of the means involved.<sup>87</sup> In that perspective, the biblical case-study reveals that the Israelite leadership valued SR to such an extent that strategic-adjustment decisions could have been entirely based upon them.

On the whole, SR is introduced in the Bible as the agent to offer the leadership a prompt and educated insight regarding the enemy's capabilities and flaws at operational level. More importantly, the practice becomes an undisputed basis upon which operational as well as strategic norms are forged. The latter does not in any way suggest that SR imposes in a metaphysical manner political/military *modus operandi*, hence failing the assumption of rationality. Quite the opposite, SR holds the capacity to provide the desired level of 'relative certainty' that the decision-making authority seeks in order to proceed with political or military decisions. As Anders Westberg explains, this is a deeply rational process: 'relative certainty' refers to

the threshold where there is sufficient actionable intelligence —intelligence with a high level of detail —on the opponent or target. A decision maker needs relative certainty to decide to continue or not with a course of action with an operation depending on the information they receive. The condition of relative certainty can and should be accompanied by a cost-benefit or risk-gain analysis and decision... an S.R mission should contribute to answering as many of the outstanding intelligence requirements as possible to achieve relative certainty.<sup>88</sup>

In other words, SR catalyses the decision-making process by providing indisputably valid data even from the internal of the enemy's camp. In that perspective, for the biblical Israelite leadership, SR is depicted as a useful tool that significantly reduces uncertainty by conducting a series of field investigations at the enemy's centre of gravity. This kind of action was mainly dictated by the special strategic conditions of that era. The Bible indicates that between the Exodus and the conquest of Canaan the Israelites were perceived by various local actors as a revisionist entity that was openly questioning the existing regional order. Characteristically, the surprise attack by the Amalekites prior to the arrival at Sinai;<sup>89</sup> the coherently negative responses — followed by total war mobilisation — of the Edomites and the Amorites to the Israeli plea for

innocent passage through their land;<sup>90</sup> and the violent reaction of 'all the Kings west of Jordan...who they gathered with one accord to fight Joshua and Israel' can be seen as a proof of the aforementioned suspicions.<sup>91</sup> In this perspective, alliances and collaborations with other nations so as to survive and achieve their objective — external balancing — was not an option. This geostrategic reality, holistically defined by the prospect of conflict that imposed an existential threat to the Israelites, established an urgent requirement for timely and legitimate strategic/operational intelligence. Moses responded to this challenge by introducing SR as the most appropriate means to reduce uncertainty in decision-making, hence directly relating SR to the very element of collective survival. Apparently, an analogous strategic reality shaped the IDF in the early years of its founding.

### **SR and the IDF**

At this point what remains to be evaluated is whether or not SR actions have been endorsed by the IDF in an analogous manner to the biblical SR operation. Inevitably, reference is made in the following paragraphs to multiple IDF's SR cases over the years occurring both in wartimes and in peace; this empirical approach will also assist in demonstrating the timeless Israeli proclivity to these practices, a fact that distinguishes the IDF from the armed forces of other states that employ SR rarely — if at all — and usually when in conflict.

The literature confirms, as shall be demonstrated below, that SR activities have been employed by the IDF since the early days of the state of Israel in a geostrategic environment that, especially during the first post-independence years, it greatly resembled the biblical days of Moses at the entrance of Canaan. In both periods the 'children of Israel' struggled hard for establishing their sovereign status, outnumbered

and without the option of external balancing, while all of the surrounding nations violently opposed this prospect. Consequently, an urgent need was established for strategic/operational intelligence as a rational way to provide foreknowledge and, hence, reduce uncertainty whenever this was attainable.<sup>92</sup> It goes without saying that the above conditions have only partially changed up to this day. On the one hand, Israel has increased its capabilities by advancing itself on the frontline of global military technology, scientific research and innovation;<sup>93</sup> at the same time, diplomatic and military partnerships have been established with powerful international actors since the mid-1950s.<sup>94</sup> On the other hand remained the unaltered fact that modern Israel has been outnumbered by fierce enemies that have been openly challenging its survival prospects over the years.<sup>95</sup> Ultimately, this volatile geostrategic environment, a common ground between the present and the biblical era, dominates Israel's security agenda to such an extent that all of the major state's choices derive from the very need to minimize the surrounding existential threats. Regarding intelligence-gathering in particular, technology did offer substantial capabilities to Israel since 1948 to meet its security demands.<sup>96</sup> However, the region's geostrategic volatility, together with the quantitative and qualitative nature of the surrounding perils almost obliged Israel to introduce SR at a very early stage.<sup>97</sup> Significant part to that played the fact that Israel, unlike most modern states, has never had easy access to conventional sources of espionage in order to gain strategic/operational intelligence on its surrounding nations.<sup>98</sup> In particular, the absence of diplomatic relations between Israel and its neighbouring adversaries — a norm of the early independence period that is still valid to this day to a great extent — rendered impossible the access to open-source, let alone classified, intelligence by diplomats and military attachés stationed in hostile nations' embassies.<sup>99</sup> Moreover, the fact that 'the Israelis were not allowed to visit these [neighbouring] Arab nations [not

even] as tourists, students, or businessmen' created unsurpassable difficulties in covertly establishing intelligence networks.<sup>100</sup> Equally unfruitful have been attempts to recruit non-Israeli individuals to provide intelligence for Israel for two main reasons. First, Israel had been lacking an appealing socio-political narrative that would attract Arabs since

'the State of Israel did not represent any beliefs or ideals other than a permanent home for the Jews. Zionism was not a universal philosophy like communism, so, unlike the Soviet Union, Israel could not rely on political ideas to recruit espionage agents'.<sup>101</sup>

Second, conscripting Arabs for espionage on non-political basis such as profit, or even pleasure, only attracted individuals of disputable credibility.<sup>102</sup> In that sense, the Israelis were obliged from day one to retrieve intelligence via adopting active, effective, high-risk, and at the same time economy of force stances; such was the practice of SR.

Accordingly, Thomas Henriksen pinpoints the introduction of SR at the mid-1950s arguing that it was then that the IDF introduced intelligence SOs to effectively collect credible intelligence to strengthen its security reflexes.<sup>103</sup> Henriksen uses the term Long-Range Reconnaissance in order to label these intelligence SOs, a term usually associated with tactical intelligence collection.<sup>104</sup> Nevertheless, his approach reveals activity with strategic/operational orientation — therefore SR — rather than tactical reconnaissance SOs.<sup>105</sup> In particular, he clarifies that the Israelis utilized intelligence SOs as a core counterterrorism instrument so as to lay the decision-making basis for further military action.<sup>106</sup> In that perspective, he presents Israeli SR not only as a paramount element of contemporary Israeli military strategy, but also as an agent that dictates further action, that is, political and military *modus operandi*.

Samuel Katz's investigation on the development of the Israeli Military Intelligence branch reveals that the IDF had been employing SR to keep Israel 'forewarned of enemy capabilities, intentions, and positions' even earlier than the mid-1950s.<sup>107</sup> Katz reports such an early activity taking place only few months after the Armistice Agreement of 1949 when the IDF launched Operation Yarkon.<sup>108</sup> The core of the action consisted of the covert deployment of six men of the elite Givati infantry brigade in the Sinai desert; the men proceeded through a distance of 70Km of mountainous and flat desert terrain, in extreme heat conditions, so as to determine whether a direct armoured-vehicle approach to Egypt via Sharm was feasible.<sup>109</sup> The mission had a purely operational character since it was carried out in order to formulate a tenable invasion plan in the Egyptian territory for the next inevitable conflict'.<sup>110</sup> Ohad Leslau confirms the fact that the IDF deployed SR operations earlier than the mid-1950s and he also adds, in favour of this argument, that the naval commando (Shayetet 13), tasked with conducting direct action as well as SR activity, was established as early as 1948 — nevertheless, he is not referring to specific SR cases.<sup>111</sup> In the years that followed, the geostrategic conditions gradually changed. This gave the opportunity to the IDF to conduct more attrition operations instead of military campaigns, yet the need for strategic/operational intelligence preserved its high importance.<sup>112</sup> Thus, after the end of the Suez war in 1956 the IDF's military-intelligence directorate was assigned its own special force, the Sayeret Matkal, destined to excel in obtaining strategic/operational intelligence.<sup>113</sup> In effect, the creation of the unit was the key move that introduced SR permanently in the IDF's ontology for the years to come. The unit has been continuously active since then, operating in line with principles that reveal the entire IDF's ethos regarding intelligence in general, and SR in particular: 'It is worthwhile to fight and die for accurate data and intelligence'.<sup>114</sup> As in the case of

Henriksen, SR is depicted in Katz's work as a constant pillar of Israel's military strategy, and an element that the Israelis directly link to the invariable presence of existential threats.

More specific SR cases further confirm these conclusions. In the early 1950s, in formulating an efficient response against Egypt, in case of a violent dispute, the IDF decided to thoroughly map the Sinai Peninsula.<sup>115</sup> Accordingly, special units were dispatched in the enemy region so as to collect topographic data.<sup>116</sup> As a result, by the time of the 1956 Suez crisis the IDF 'knew Sinai better than the Egyptians who had been stationed there for years'.<sup>117</sup> This, among other factors, resulted in an IDF triumph, giving the strategic advantage to the Israelis to control 'a peninsula three times as large as Israel in less than eight days of fighting'.<sup>118</sup> Few years later, Sayeret Tzanhanim (paratroopers) commandos repeatedly infiltrated during night the heavily guarded Syrian border and installed tapping devices along the telephone lines connecting Syrian military establishments across the Golan Heights.<sup>119</sup> The SR operations were launched in order to provide early warning intelligence to the IDF so as to develop a pre-emptive strategy against the severe shelling of the Israeli settlements around the sea of Galilee by the Syrian artillery stationed at the Golan Heights.<sup>120</sup> Similar was the geostrategic setting in the 1960s; by 1968, PLO's blind hits against Israeli targets adopted a normative frequency.<sup>121</sup> In order to formulate a deterrence strategy to present to the government — involving reprisal strikes at the PLO bases along the river Jordan — the IDF began collecting vital intelligence by making use of a small unit of Sayeret paratroopers deployed inside Jordan.<sup>122</sup> Another SR operation was launched a few months later when three heavy duty helicopters transported a group of Israeli commandos to the Egyptian base of Ras Arab where two Soviet P12 radar equipment shelters were operating.<sup>123</sup> The operatives fastened the entire radar system to the

helicopters and took it back to Israel intact, along with operation manuals, files and charts.<sup>124</sup> The impact of the operation was substantial since 'the abduction of the radar afforded Aman (military intelligence directorate) and the IDF a first-hand look at the Egyptian air defence network'.<sup>125</sup> On another occasion, during the 1980s, members of the Sayeret Matkal were collecting strategic and operational intelligence in Tunisia — where the PLO had relocated after its expulsion from Lebanon.<sup>126</sup> The unit had been operating covertly in the country to identify possible future threats for Israel.<sup>127</sup> Apparently, the role of these SR activities in the assassination of Abu Jihad, the PLO's top military figure, in his Tunis home in 1988 was of paramount importance.<sup>128</sup> More recent SR examples date to the late 2010s. In 2017, a team of Sayeret Matkal operatives infiltrated northern Syria to plant microphones in a location where an ISIS cell meeting was about to be held;<sup>129</sup> the manufacturing of a new weapon, planted inside laptops and designed to escape airport security controls, was on the agenda of the gathering.<sup>130</sup> The operation was successful and soon an additional team of special operatives, located several kilometres away on the Golan Heights, intercepted transmissions that confirmed that 'ISIS had obtained a new way to cause airliners to explode suddenly, free-falling from the sky in flames'.<sup>131</sup> The Israelis shared the information with their US colleagues and as a result, specific measures as a precaution were issued regarding passengers' transfer of specific electronic devices for a five-month period of time in the US;<sup>132</sup> a similar decree was also issued by the British authorities at the time.<sup>133</sup> The most recent known case of an IDF's SR operation appeared on the press in 2018 and details of the mission still surface up to this day; accordingly, a team of 16 Sayeret Matkal operatives infiltrated into Gaza in early November 'in an intelligence-gathering mission so as to plant spying devices in the private communications network of Hamas'.<sup>134</sup> Apparently, the mission was uncovered and ended up in bloodshed.<sup>135</sup>



Perhaps the most characteristic Israeli SR case occurred in 2006 when a satellite image received by the IDF, showing the construction of a military site in eastern Syria, triggered a series of events that demonstrate the significance of SR in the Israeli political/military decision making. Analysts suggested, though not conclusively, that the photographed site resembled a nuclear reactor in the making.<sup>136</sup> In March 2007, the construction in eastern Syria gained further momentum since Mossad's reports reinforced the IDF's speculations.<sup>137</sup> Still, at this early stage, the Israelis could not confirm with absolute certainty that they were dealing with a nuclear reactor.<sup>138</sup> Despite the fact that in a similar situation in the early 1980s Israel had bombed an Iraqi facility without risking a full-scale war, the decision to repeat such an action in Syria had the potential to trigger a wider conflict in the Middle East.<sup>139</sup> Under these circumstances, Israel's strategy was clear: the site had to be destroyed, but not with Israeli involvement. Accordingly, the Israelis focused on persuading via diplomatic channels the US administration to bomb the facility as the best way to remove the threat without risking a full-scale conflagration.<sup>140</sup> On these grounds, in April 2007, they presented the White House with the raw data that they had at their disposal.<sup>141</sup> The US administration replied on July 13 that a US strike was out of question and diplomacy should prevail.<sup>142</sup> Clearly, with this response at hand, the Israeli administration had to adjust its strategy for dealing with the situation. However, independently of the ongoing diplomatic contacts with the US, the Israelis had already been preparing an SR mission since early June — directly approved by the Prime Minister, a month before the official US denial to lead a military action initiative — so as to evaluate the threat.<sup>143</sup> Consequently, the mission was not an after-effect of the US response, but it had been decided *a priori* as an integrated part of the Israeli political/military *modus operandi* as soon as the threat was realized and started to clear up even further; indeed, the beginning of the training of the

SR operatives in June coincided with a set of new satellite images that 'reinforced the confidence that the site in question was a nuclear reactor'.<sup>144</sup> The SR mission aimed at obtaining first-hand data so as to conclusively confirm that the site was beyond doubt a nuclear facility and whether or not it had been activated; the latter being a crucial piece of information since had the reactor been 'hot', a strike on the site would have been out of question.<sup>145</sup> Hence, in August 2007, a Sayeret Matkal unit was dispatched to Syria to 'get as close to the reactor as possible and return with pictures and soil samples'.<sup>146</sup> The operatives were dropped at night by a pair of helicopters several kilometres away from the site and later that night they reached the reactor via driving military jeeps — also brought in by helicopter — and on foot.<sup>147</sup> The soldiers covertly approached the guarded facility and managed to successfully collect soil samples from the perimeter prior to proceed to the extraction point.<sup>148</sup> The analysis of the retrieved specimens not only confirmed that the site was indeed a nuclear reactor, but it was soon to become operational.<sup>149</sup> The undisputed findings of the SR catalyzed both political and military decision-making; hence, few days after the SR report and the laboratory results of the soil specimens, the Israelis had already proceeded with a major, and extremely risky, second-order strategic adjustment decision to strike on their own. Indeed, soon after the mission, the Israeli Prime Minister and the chief of the military intelligence were not elaborating on whether or not to strike the Syrian site, but on how many planes they should be using for the task.<sup>150</sup> Eventually, the airstrike took place on September 5.<sup>151</sup>

The Syrian nuclear incident emphatically reminded the Israeli military /political echelon that the biblical geostrategic environment that had Israel left at its own devices against its foes in ancient Middle East, and then again in the early post-independence years, had not changed; times still required extreme vigilance and, most importantly, investment in developing self-help capabilities:

When Bush called Olmert in July 2007 to inform him of his decision not to attack Syria, the Israeli prime minister immediately understood that this applied to Iran as well. If Bush was not willing to approve an attack against a single facility in Syria that would have little fallout, there was no way he would one day order a large-scale multi-targeted attack against Iran that could lead to a regional war. Israel, Olmert understood, would always be alone.<sup>152</sup>

As Yaakov Katz states, Israel is a nation-state

threatened like no one else. But it takes its role—the preservation of the Jewish people—seriously. As the ancient Jewish sage Hillel asked some 2,000 years ago: 'If I am not for myself, who will be for me?'<sup>153</sup>

All of the above emphatically confirm that SR has been holding a leading role in Israel's strategy against a timeless norm of existential threats; not only as a strategic/operational intelligence-collection capability in wartime but mostly as a political/military decision-making catalyst in the IDF's relentless effort to ensure Israel's survival, security and peace. The IDF has been employing SR operations systematically since 1949; hence, it is no coincidence that most SR cases found in contemporary bibliography are in fact IDF operations. Clearly, Moses' rational, high-risk, economy of force self-help ethos towards strategic/operational intelligence-gathering, a stance that is depicted in his orders to his ancient special operatives — to 'Go...and see...and take pains'<sup>154</sup> — is by all means still present in the IDF's *SR modus operandi*.

## **Conclusions**

Moses' intelligence operation in Canaan represents the earliest recorded SR case in literature; on these grounds, the biblical Israelites should be considered the forerunners of the concept. The presence of SR activity in the bible presents a ground breaking finding on its own since it demonstrates that the biblical Israelite military thought was not confined to the strict boundaries of tactical thinking — a characteristic of the

classical strategy era — but it had spread across the strategic and operational planes. Accordingly, SR emerges in the Bible as the *lapis angularis* of Israel's military strategy and at the same time as a military norm capable of catalyzing both military as well as political decision-making; hence, as a practice capable of equally affecting *modus operandi* of military and political orientation. Overall, SR is depicted in the Bible as the Israeli rational response to the uncertainties associated with a strategic environment saturated with multiple existential threats. In that sense, SR is directly related to the very survival of Israel.

Over two millennia later, in an analogous regional setting of multiple existential threats, the IDF re-employed the daring biblical practice and resorted to intense SR action since the early years of independence. Thenceforth, it has been using the practice consistently in war- and peace-times. Conceptual similarities between biblical and contemporary SR activity are apparent in a threefold manner:

- Contemporary SR is directly associated with continued existential threats that create a constant need for addressing uncertainties, rather than with other strategic environmental factors, including Israel's significant capability improvement in issue areas such as technology, armament, diplomacy, etc. Hence, as in biblical times, SR is linked to the survival of the state.
- Though contemporary SR has not been the cornerstone of Israel's military strategy, it has undoubtedly become one of its timeless landmark pillars, being traceable throughout Israel's modern military history.
- As in the biblical era, SR is valued by contemporary Israelis as an undisputed means of reducing uncertainties and is, in that sense, capable of dictating military and political norms.

Ultimately, the investigation of the concept of SR establishes an undisputable link between the Israelite strategic thought of the biblical era and that of modern times. Inevitably, and perhaps more importantly, SR becomes one of the many unremitting bonds between the Israeli ontology of the past and present; a critical link that joins in a realistic manner the biblical struggle for returning to Canaan with the present security challenges to maintain it amidst hostilities and terror.

## Notes

1. Department of the Army, *FM 31-20-5*, glossary-10.
2. NATO, *Glossary*, 121.
3. *Ibid.*, 93.
4. *Ibid.*, 125.
5. *Ibid.*, 121.
6. *Ibid.*, 94.
7. *Ibid.*, 125.
8. Department of the Army, *FM 3-05-20*, 2-15.
9. Department of the Army, *ADRP 3-05*, 2-6.
10. NATO-RUSSIA Joint Editorial Working Group, *NATO-Russia Glossary*, 197.
11. *Written Ministerial Statement (5 April, Column 130WS)*.
12. Eriksson and Pettersson, *Special Operations*, 107.
13. Henderson, "Chinese Special Forces", 31.
14. Morgenthau and Thompson, *Politics Among Nations*, 4-14.
15. Glaser, *Rational Theory of International Politics*, 2.
16. Wight, *International Theory*, 126.
17. Pettman, *World Politics*, 74-75.
18. Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 63-64.
19. Mearsheimer, "Reckless States and Realism", 244.
20. Berlin and Brettler, *The Jewish Study Bible*.
21. Kiras, *Special Operations and Strategy*, 2-4.
22. *Ibid.*
23. NATO, *Glossary*, 118.
24. European External Agency Service, *EUMC Glossary*, 88.
25. *Ibid.*
26. U.S. Department of Defense, "Dictionary", 199-200.

27. Joint Publication 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, I-1.
28. Eriksson and Pettersson, *Special Operations*, 121.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Leebaert, *To Dare and to Conquer*, 22.
34. Ibid., 44.
35. Thomas, "Commando Operations in Modern Warfare", 689-690.
36. Leebaert, *To Dare and to Conquer*, 28-34.
37. Dvornik, *Origins of Intelligence Services*, 3-5.
38. Department of the Army, *FM 34-2-1*, glossary-5.
39. Ibid., 1.1.
40. Ibid., 2-3.
41. Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt, Vol. III.*, 131.
42. Fagles and Knox, *Homer: The Iliad*, 283-295.
43. Finley and Warner, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, VIII-100.
44. Brownson, *Xenophon*, 465.
45. Milner, *Vegetius*, 75, 109.
46. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire*, 62.
47. Luvaas, "Napoleon's Use of Intelligence", 42-43.
48. Andrew, *The Secret World*, 497.
49. McGrath, *The Development of Reconnaissance Units*, 42.
50. Kummer, *U.S. Marines in Afghanistan*, 291.
51. Westberg, "In Silence Toward the Unknown", 1-2.
52. Kiras, *Special Operations and Strategy*, 108.
53. Gentry, "Intelligence Services and Special Operations Forces", 657-666.
54. Ibid., 657-658.
55. Sirrs, *A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service*, 48-49.
56. Westberg, "To See and not to be Seen", 128.
57. Henriksen, *The Israeli Approach to Irregular Warfare*, 14.
58. The White House, *The National Security Strategy*, 16.
59. Department of the Army, *FM 3-05.20*, 1.3-1.4.
60. Department of the Army, *ADRP 3-05*, 3-1 - 3.2.
61. Bukkvoll, "Military Innovation Under Authoritarian Government", 608.
62. Westberg, "To See and not to be Seen", 125.
63. Ibid., 124.

64. Katz, *Soldier Spies*, 319.
65. Numbers: 13.1-29.
66. Feldman, "Moses the General", 4.
67. Gabriel, *The Military History of Ancient Israel*, 99-100.
68. Sicker, *The Theopolitical Discourses of Moses*, 34-35.
69. Serrano, *Biblical Principles for Resilience in Leadership*, 40.
70. Numbers: 1.1-47.
71. Ibid., 2.1-34.
72. Ibid., 2.1-31, 10.11-28.
73. as in Numbers: 2.1-34, 7.10-83, 10.11-28, and 13.1-16 respectively.
74. The version of the Tanakh that the authors use for the purpose of this study makes use of the words 'troops' and 'chieftains' respectively.
75. Numbers: 13.1-4.
76. Serrano, *Biblical Principles for Resilience in Leadership*, 40.
77. Numbers: 13.21.
78. Ibid., 13.27-31.
79. Yonge, *The Works of Philo*, On the Life of Moses I, XL (224).
80. Musco, "Intelligence Gathering", 8.
81. Gabriel, *The Military History of Ancient Israel*, 100.
82. Curzer, "Spies and Lies", 194-195.
83. Numbers: 13.25-14.45.
84. Ibid., 14.1-38.
85. Ibid., 14.39-44.
86. Dueck, *Reluctant Crusaders*, 12.
87. Ibid.
88. Westberg, "To See and not to be Seen", 126-127.
89. Exodus: 17.8-16.
90. Numbers: 20.14-21.
91. Joshua: 9.1-2.
92. Katz, *Soldier Spies*, 52.
93. Katz, "The Most Technologically Advanced Military".
94. Ziv, "Shimon Peres and the French-Israeli Alliance", 407.
95. Meir, "Israel in Search of Lasting Peace", 447.
96. Katz, *Soldier Spies*, 192-193.
97. Ibid., 103-104.
98. Ibid., 68-70.
99. Ibid., 68-69.

100. Ibid., 69.
101. Ibid., 70.
102. Ibid.
103. Henriksen, *The Israeli Approach to Irregular Warfare*, 13-14.
104. Ibid., 14.
105. Ibid., 14-15.
106. Ibid., 14.
107. Katz, *Soldier Spies*, 103.
108. Ibid., 129-131.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid.
111. Leslau, "Israeli Experience and the Utility of Special Operations Forces", 516.
112. Katz, *Soldier Spies*, 143.
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid.
115. Luttwak and Horowitz, *The Israeli Army*, 118.
116. Ibid.
117. Ibid.
118. Ibid., 147.
119. Katz, *Soldier Spies*, 109-110.
120. Ibid.
121. Betser and Rosenberg, *Secret Soldier*, 6.
122. Ibid., 7.
123. Katz, *Soldier Spies*, 213-214.
124. Ibid., 214.
125. Ibid.
126. Ibid., 341.
127. Ibid.
128. Ibid.
129. Blum, "What Trump Really Told Kislyak".
130. Ibid.
131. Ibid.
132. Ibid.
133. Elgot and Chulov, "UK Bans Laptops".
134. Middle East Eye, "New Details of Botched Israeli Operation".
135. Ibid.
136. Katz, *Shadow Strike*, 32.



137. Ibid., 40-41.
138. Ibid., 42.
139. Ibid., 13.
140. Ibid., 96.
141. Ibid., 15.
142. Ibid., 120-122.
143. Ibid., 160.
144. Ibid., 62.
145. Ibid., 159-160.
146. Ibid., 159.
147. Ibid., 162-163.
148. Ibid., 163.
149. Ibid.
150. Ibid., 164.
151. Ibid., 182.
152. Ibid., 275.
153. Ibid., 282.
154. Numbers: 13.17-20.

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