

Variants of the ‘underdog culture’ in Greek public opinion: soft and hard-core Russophilia

Abstract: Contemporary Russophilia is examined in this article as an outstanding feature of Greek political culture. Recent opinion polls (2016-2017) are used to validate a distinction between two different types of Russophilia: *the soft*, described as a positive predisposition towards Russia, and *the hard-core*, which suggests an embrace of Russia by breaking with Greece’s ties to the West. Hard-core Russophilia surfaces as a fitting element in Diamantouros’ underdog culture, as it uncovers sentiments of isolation, support for traditional values and fear towards Western values of modernity. The paper confirms the analytical capacity of the ‘cultural dualism’ framework, not as a dichotomy between modernizers and underdogs, but through the identification and measurement of different layers that outline the contemporary profile of hard-core Russophilia.

Keywords: political culture, cultural dualism, Greek public opinion, Russophilia

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Introduction

While Russia’s image suffers globally (Huang and Cha 2020) and public opinion in almost every EU member state manifests a negative stance towards Russia, Greece is an exception. In particular, Greek public opinion is overwhelmingly positive vis-à-vis Russia and especially its leader, Vladimir Putin. According to Pew Research, this forms a long-lasting trend as, from 2012 to 2020, around six out of ten Greeks expressed a positive view on Russia. Within the context of the EU, this pattern seems comparable to the ones found in Bulgaria and Slovakia. On the international scene, the Philippines appear to bear more similarities with Greece and its public opinion than Greece’s counterparts in the EU.

Furthermore, European public opinion shows no confidence at all in Putin’s leadership, as according to Pew Research, the median of non-confidence is 72% whilst only 27% shows confidence. Bulgaria leads the confidence index (62% confidence, 30% no confidence), while Greece stands at the second place (52% confidence, 43% no confidence). Again, this outlook constitutes an important element of differentiation from the rest of the EU countries. For example, Greek public opinion in 2019

manifested a positive outlook not shared by most EU countries, in particular Germany (36% negative, 61% positive), France (28% positive, 71% negative), the Netherlands (25% positive, 75% negative), Spain (21% positive, 77% negative), Sweden (17% positive, 81% negative) or even Italy (38% positive, 53% negative).

This trend attests to a noteworthy current of Russophilia in Greek public opinion. However, different contexts, such as news media, politics, literature, arts, exhibit a variety of Russophile characteristics. Recent studies of the image of Russia in Greek newspapers and online news sites indicate that the political orientation of the news source plays an important role on the views on Russia. The most positive outlook comes from the right and left poles, whereas the most sceptical from the centre-right and centre-left. Positive opinions about Russia are most commonly present in discussions of topics that are also linked with Western policies, such as the conflict in the Middle East or the Crimea crisis. The perception that Putin has the right to defend Russia's interests by standing up to the West is frequently accompanied with a critical view towards the West. The West is criticized for its selective intervention in various parts of the world or for the role as a global policeman (Paschalidis 2018).

In spite of the self-explanatory character of the notion, we would like to clarify what we mean by 'Russophilia'. In our case, we perceive it to be the positive disposition towards and support for Russian policies or Russia's role in international affairs and even of key Russian figures (i.e. politicians). In fact, the phenomenon of Russophilia in Greece can be regarded, in many aspects, as a paradox. If one focuses on the 20th century, Greece has been an integral part of the West from a political, economic and even cultural point of view. Nevertheless, the nature of this belonging is still under consideration in the wider discussion of Greek political culture and its relation to Western modernity. Contrary to other countries with an equally important manifestation of the phenomenon (i.e. Bulgaria), Greece has never experienced political or economic dependency on Russia and its predecessor, the Soviet Union. The endeavour to interpret Russophilia in the Greek context becomes all the more necessary. Most commonly, Russophilia is a notion evoked in historical studies dealing with the 19th century and the evolution of the Greek nation-state after the War of Independence (1821). In modern Greece and the period of *Metapolitefsi* (1974-today), the notion seems to be more frequent in studies on Greece's sometimes ambivalent disposition towards the West and particularly in regard to Greece's relationship with the EU. Such, for example, could include the study of Greece's severe economic crisis and the EU's bailout programmes. (Petsinis 2016).

What is the nature of contemporary Russophilia and its link to the contemporary Greek political culture? While Russophilia could be viewed as a distinct attribute of the Greek political culture, we support that it should not be viewed as a uniform set of

attitudes. In essence, we distinguish two forms of Russophilia: firstly, hard core Russophilia and hard-line Russophiles and, secondly, soft Russophilia and superficial Russophiles. Soft Russophilia does not extend beyond a positive demeanour towards Russia whilst hard-core Russophilia goes beyond that, proposing an alternative strategic orientation favouring ties with Russia, rather than the contemporary pro-Western default.

Furthermore, we will explore hard-core Russophilia using the analytical capacity of the ‘underdog culture’ theory of Diamantouros (2000). The underdog culture theory provides an explanatory framework that links specific dispositions of values and beliefs with social action. For example, according to a key premise of the cultural theory, the dichotomy between modernizers and traditionalists doesn’t only assign distinct values to the two different groups; it could also explain variants of trust or civic engagement. In other words, a traditionalist could trust less democratic institutions, whether a modernizer would favour Greece’s EU membership (Armakolas and Triantafyllou 2017). If hard-core Russophilia poses a reflection of the underdog culture, then hard-core Russophiles should share common values and orientations. Subsequently, the next question that arises is how homogenous and aligned are these hard-core Russophiles, as the underdog theory -at least partially- would imply. So, the main purpose of this paper is not an exhaustive analysis of the merits and pitfalls of the underdog theory, but an understanding of the nature and the character of contemporary Russophilia in Greece. Thereafter, we formulate two research hypotheses. The first corresponds to the distinction between soft and hard Russophilia:

H1. There are distinct characteristics between the soft or superficial Russophiles and hard-core or hard-line Russophiles.

The second hypothesis (H2) provides an elaboration of the cultural dualism framework. In essence, the hypothesis developed posits that:

H2. The hard-line Russophiles present a distinct set of attitudes and beliefs that fit the underdog culture.

Methodologically, this study sets out to explore an under-researched topic, with potential implications for the interpretation of political behaviour. We will address the above hypotheses by using quantitative data from two different sources; (a) a nation-wide survey conducted by the Public Opinion Research Unit (PORU) at the University of Macedonia Research Institute (n= 1024, field: 15-17 September 2017) and (b) from nation-wide survey commissioned by the Greek think tank diaNEOsis, ran by PORU, with the title ‘What Greeks believe – 2016’ (n=1294, field: 30 November – 3 December 2016).

Firstly, we will provide the contextual information which makes the exploration of the contemporary Russophilia crucial for understanding political behaviours and developments. Then, we will elaborate on the theoretical considerations of the cultural dualism theory and, thirdly, we will present the empirical evidence that support both our hypotheses. This paper has the ambition to achieve two significant contributions: to propose a systematic understanding of an issue thus far under-researched, Russophilia in modern Greece, and to introduce, define and measure particular types of Russophilia.

1. The contextual background

Contrary to what one might have expected, the phenomenon of contemporary Greek Russophilia has not been addressed systematically in the academic literature. To the extent that it has, there appears to be a consensus that positive views on Russia, without being a new phenomenon, have been multiplied in the context of the economic crisis (2008-today) (Petsinis 2016; Ntampoudi 2014a; Ntampoudi 2014b). Interestingly enough, the culmination of such stances coincided with a significant rise in negative views towards the West (the EU and Germany in particular), seen as responsible for the adoption of harsh bailout programmes. The most positive views on Russia came during a period in which two of the most important expressions of Greece's political and economic ties to the West (its EU and Eurozone membership) were several times on the brink of collapse.

Between 2012 and 2015, Greece experienced major political developments, as the 2012 'earthquake' elections reset the party politics and the party system (Dinas and Rori 2013; Teperoglou and Tsatsanis 2014). After the transition to democracy in 1974 and the stabilization of the democratic system, it was the very first time that the establishment was questioned so rigidly. The 2015 election confirmed the trend, and SYRIZA, a formerly radical party of the left, rose to power. One of the implications of the new government was the challenging of previously agreed policies on the implementation of the bailout agreement. The first semester of 2015 was marked by political manoeuvres that called into question Greece's pro-EU path and strategy. Also, it led to the referendum of 5th July 2015 on the adoption or the rejection of economic measures proposed by the EU.

In May 2015, PM Tsipras' visit to Moscow was complimented by the request of assistance in printing a new currency, in case Greece was to leave the European monetary union (Davet and Lhomme 2016). This probability sent shock waves among policy analysts and scholars, many of whom focused on the deeper meaning of this Greek-Russia rapprochement, frequently in the wider South-East European context (Bechev 2017). Eventually, in the aftermath of 2015 referendum, the strategic choice

of Tsipras administration to settle with the EU institutions rather than opting for a unilateral move, cleared things up. SYRIZA paid a high price, as half of the party officials abandoned it, creating their own caucus, but eventually the party reaffirmed its dominant position by winning the 2015 September elections.

Despite the existence of pro-Russian perceptions throughout modern Greek history, there are many indications that the rise in such dispositions in Metapolitefsi is directly linked with Greece's ambivalent relation with the West. In other words, it can be considered as a side-effect or as a by-product of this ambivalence. Recently, in the period of the economic crisis, the tension and negotiations with EU and IMF, was used as a common justification in populist approaches that called for an alternative strategy, to develop closer ties with Russia (Tsebelis 2016; Zahariadis 2017; Efthymiopoulos 2016).

SYRIZA's foreign and financial policies when in power (2015-2019) neither questioned nor altered Greece's position in Western or Euro- Atlantic alliances and structures. SYRIZA's proposed policies and public discourse as the major opposition party (2012-2015) frequently appeared to possess an anti-West edge; in government, however, SYRIZA demonstrated an important degree of political realism, which was in sharp contrast to its populist tendencies as an opposition party (Mavrozacharakis, Tzagkarakis, and Kotroyannos 2017). The transformation of SYRIZA into a mainstream centre-left and pro-western party, indicated that Greece's political elites have moved even further towards strategic realism rather than exceptionalism, a major component of which seems to be a periodic flirt with Russia (Triantaphyllou 2018; Pedi 2017). Nevertheless, the very fact that SYRIZA attempted to play the Russia card, without major reactions, is another indication of a significant trend of Russophilia.

Last, but certainly not least, a critical challenge that stresses the importance of studying contemporary Russophilia regards the entanglement with influences that could boost political behaviour and ultimately challenge the current establishment. This could potentially be spotted in the call for a new European right and the vision for a pan-European movement that defies the current multi-cultural diversity in favour of an 'organic cultural ethnic process' (Shekhovtsov 2009, 697) under Russia's leadership and also the Eurasian ideology (Laruelle 2006; Laruelle 2015). In essence, the operationalisation of the Eurasian doctrine concerns the actors that implement this vision and have a direct influence in domestic politics, such as the party of Golden Dawn in Greece or Jobbik in Hungary (Petsinis 2014). In other words, the recent political developments -and the collapse of the previous dominant party system- would be further complicated by an exacerbation of far-right sentiment.

The exploration of Russophilia, invites one to consider the larger framework of Greek political culture in its quality of attitudes and beliefs that give meaning to a political process (Pye 1991). As it is the case with similar types of elements, they evolve with time whilst their meaning is constantly reconfigured and negotiated in the public sphere. Furthermore, the evidence, so far, from all fields, such as politics, public opinion and media, allude to various degrees of the disposition, for example, superficial versus incidental or systematic versus consistent.

2. Theoretical background

We will attempt to understand Greek Russophilia in the context of approaches pertaining to Greek political culture. This notion goes beyond the rational or institutional analysis, offering a broader understanding of individual and collective behaviours. It provides valuable insights in an attempt to understand specific attitudes and evolving behaviours. It reflects different socialization experiences and is resistant to rapid change (Eatwell 1997).

Political culture regards values and beliefs in the micro- and the meso- levels as essential foundations to understand the macro level cultural mentality, norms and traditions. For instance, the use of behavioural techniques in the seminal work of Almond and Verba (1963) offered arguments that in comparative perspective explain differences in the trust and in social engagement to democracy. Subsequently, the merit of the political analysis in this study, is that it reveals a specific propensity to political action, which influences subjective orientations and different responses (Inglehart 1990, 19), guided by factors such as ‘traditions, historical memories, motives, norms, emotions, and symbols’ (Kavanagh 1972, 10–11).

Greek cultural dualism and the underdog culture

Focusing on the Greek political culture, Diamantouros (2000) suggests that there are two antagonistic groups, both of which incorporate a distinct cultural identity. The theory of cultural dualism proposes that the cultural elements in contemporary Greece could be understood by the antithesis and the antagonism between reformists and underdogs. This distinction incorporates many long-lasting elements of differentiation like attitudes and values. On the one hand, one finds the older traditional identity, with a phobic and introvert understanding of the world order; it favours isolation and a defensive stance to potential changes while it views modern values as a threat to tradition. On the other hand, the modern cultural identity shares a competitive, extrovert view of the world, a quest for modern structures, reforms, and adaptation to western counterparts.

The core values of these two antagonistic identities differ substantially. The reformist culture adopts a pro-western and a pro-liberal approach. The openness that defines this identity wishes for Greece to achieve greater levels of similarity with other EU member states. The underdog culture faces the openness as a challenge that will be harmful to the status-quo, bringing losses rather than opportunities. The epicentre of the underdog culture is the victimization, the introvert and the sentiments of nationalism. In Tsoukalis' formulation (2002; 1997), there are 'two Greeces'. The one that believes in 'meritocracy and fair competition ... and wants their windows open to the rest of the world' (35), while the other pursues 'closed borders, clientelism ... fears the novel, the foreign and the different'.

The dualism of the proposed scheme offers an opportunity to delve deeper and distinguish two dimensions: the context and the vision. The analytical capacity of the cultural dualism theory covers the specific beliefs and attitudes of the people belonging to each group. Following the rationale of the theory, the two antagonistic groups are expected to share different values, attitudes and behaviours. The core logic of the theory is that the cultural elements that prevail in each identity are apparent in the way people think, form attitudes and express themselves. So, in terms of the context, of 'what we believe', and the vision, of 'where should this country move towards', these two antagonistic groups are expected to differ substantially.

Regarding the analytical capacity of his theory, Diamantouros advanced the salient proposition that, in principle, there are two important characteristics that need to be taken into consideration. Firstly, the cultural dualism theory is *permeable and omnipresent*. These two traits are interdependent (Diamantouros 2000, 40) and crucial to understand both the analytical dynamic of the theory as well as its critics. The element of the permeability means that both cultures could be present within structures, institutions and social groups, while they form the identity of each group, without excluding the possibility that they change over time. For example, Stavrakakis (2002) advances the pertinent idea that, in Greece, some groups could be easily aligned with a modernizer PM like Simitis in one issue, while being closer to the positions of the Orthodox Church against the removal of religious affiliation on identity cards (dubbed the 'identities crisis'). With the characteristic of omnipresence, Diamantouros suggests that during the gradual formulation process of Greek institutions, structures and societal groups, both cultures existed and had an important role in shaping their outlook.

The theory of cultural dualism doesn't come without critics, challengers or attempts to improve it. Firstly, there are challenges on the core argument that a favourable view towards modernity necessarily implies a set of conditions that guarantee progress and development. Liakos (2013) challenges the notion that modernity moves forward or guarantees development, as there is neither a single

dimension of modernity nor a single dimension of tradition. So, there are multiple facades, ‘modernities’ and ‘traditionalities’, shaping the national narrative. Secondly, there is an attempt to conceptualize the ‘modernization thesis’ (Ntampoudi 2014b), as a strategic, rather than an analytical concept. This argument regards the ‘modernization thesis’ as a pro-western and Eurocentric perception of modernity (Tsoukalas 1983; Tziovas 2017), and not as a universal vision of progress.

Limitations and extensions of cultural dualism in Greece

Other scholars criticize cultural dualism for its oversimplification. For example, Pantelidou Malouta (2015) considers the dipole ‘manichaistic’, as it presents two ‘Greeces’ fighting each other in order to prevent or impose ‘change’. Furthermore, she finds the theory obscure and static as an analytical tool. In her view, it fails to include social powers, dynamics and cleavages, since it functions more as a conceptual framework rather than a theory. Diamantouros had already responded in advance to these issues. The elements of permeability and omnipresence are inherited characteristics of the theory. In other words, cultural dualism is not a static concept but pays attention to the dynamics between the two identities. Nevertheless, scholars still questioned the analytical utility of the ‘tradition versus modernity’ mechanism in a pursuit of more consistency in measuring their reach (Demertzis 1997).

Some critiques challenged not only the core notion of antagonism but also the firm structure around modernizers and underdogs. For example, Voulgaris, whilst analysing various formats of antitheses in the orientation of Greek public opinion (e.g., west/east, populism/modernization, tradition/cosmopolitanism, political participation/private affairs private/collective interests, family values/modern social welfare), concludes that it’s not about dualism but ‘contradictory admixtures of perceptions and values that characterize broad social groups and individuals’ (Voulgaris 2013, 412). For Voulgaris, it’s not about a societal or political dichotomy, but rather ideas and attitudes. Thus, his conception does not build upon the dichotomy of dualism. Whilst the notion of reformist vs. underdog culture proposes a set of contradictory, concrete thoughts, approaches, values and attitudes, Voulgaris’ multiverse of values and perceptions, implies that either collectively or individually, people may adopt the one or the other approach. This argument is similar to Stavrakakis’ analysis (ibid) and examples on the populism that unfolded during the ‘identities crisis’.

Similarly, Katroungalos (2013) defies the analytical capacity of the dualism theory. In fact, he describes it as a form of Orientalism (ibid, 141) as he considers it as a reductive notion that disregards complex issues of social life, such as the class struggle or social differentiations. Indeed, Orientalism is thought as a particular

discourse and a system of knowledge imposing an essentialist and negatively connoted image of the Orient (Said 1978). In Europe, Orientalism has been applied mainly in the context of deconstructive approaches aiming at neutralizing the excessive discourses, originating in the West, towards regions that are thought to be in the periphery of the Western world not only geographically, politically and economically, but also culturally and symbolically. Therefore particular interest has been paid to the construction or depiction of regions such as the Balkans (Todorova 1997) or Eastern Europe (Wolff 1994) as 'Others towards Europe'.

Bakić-Hayden (1995) proposed the notion of nesting orientalisms in order to highlight the more complex dynamics of exclusion in identity politics and the reproduction of such dichotomies within borderline regions such as the post- Yugoslav space and the Balkans. Ballinger (2017), similarly, links the continuous relevance and application of such deconstructive approaches with their capacity to emphasize asymmetries and inequalities, whilst demonstrating that a certain degree of ambiguity in their quality as analytical tools can be attributed to a self- projected marginalization in relation to an elusive Western standard. In this light, it is certain that cultural dualism is relevant, to a certain extent, to the more general discussion of the scientific knowledge's impact on perceptions of Otherness. However, one has to be cautious when it comes to labelling, as-after all, cultural dualism deals with specific phenomena and institutions in comparative politics and political culture and not cultural history, culture or history per se.

Xenakis (2013) suggests another conceptualization, closer to Voulgaris' analysis. In her view, cultural dualism cannot present a dipole of two antagonistic identities, since there is a hybrid of both traditional/reformist approaches as both dimensions are interconnected. This hybrid scheme suggests that individual behaviours should be viewed as mixed or hybrid standpoints without reflecting cultural roots on an evolving root. The concept of the 'hybrid scheme' exemplifies an attempt not to defy the dualism theory, but to understand the complexity of social reality. In fact, the absence of a clear cut between reformists and underdogs has already been signalled in cultural dualism.

In a similar vein, Marangudakis (2019), who studies Greek political culture through the prism of multiple modernities (Eisenstadt 2002; Eisenstadt 2006) does not insist on a binary opposition (i.e. parochial vs. modern). Though recognizing the analytical value of cultural dualism, Marangudakis insists that the absence of a civic culture can be also explained by the Greek social actors' mixed strategies and the incorporation of contrasting elements (i.e. parochial/ modern). The traits that he enumerates as factors that hamper the emergence of civic culture are: clientelism, amoral familism, lack of solidarity and weak civil society, lack of rational bureaucratic

structures, lack of modern rational ethos, lack of social responsibility and lack of in-worldly ethics (Marangudakis *ibid*, 429–431).

In contrast, Mitralaxis (2017) explores the clarity of the dualism theory. He specifies several analytical efforts on the basis of a dichotomy between antagonistic groups, with distinct and opposite beliefs that provide a better understanding of the outputs and specific actions that form collective behaviours and individual beliefs. Therefore, the dynamic between reformists and underdogs leads either to social change or the preservation of the status quo. For instance, the work of Veremis (2017), exploring four different divisive periods of the Greek history, from the Greek Revolution of 1821, to the National Divide of 1915-1920 and more recently the post-1974 era, constitutes an example of a dualism depicted in historical instances. Also, Kalpadakis and Sotiropoulos (2007) use this theory to explain variations in Greek foreign policy. In brief, Mitralaxis concludes in favour of the analytical dynamic of the theory and its usefulness, as a tool and a standpoint, even if one does not necessarily adhere to its premises.

Pagoulatos (2004) offers a thought-provoking example of the ways in which the underdog culture and cultural dualism theories could act as fertile frameworks for mapping out dominant and antagonistic agendas- in his case in Greece's economic policies in the 1980's without necessarily establishing clear cut poles. He proposes a consideration of his central notion of 'national exceptionalism' as a set of attitudes that support the idea that each country is different and exceptional. From a cultural point of view, this notion is founded upon cultural dualism. In fact, he distinguishes between three layers of national exceptionalism: a soft (ideas that are preconditions), a stronger one (elements of a political- ideological agenda) and a third, the strongest (the political desirability of the notion).

Another interpretation scheme of the attitude of Russophilia comes from the populist framework. The term 'framework' instead of 'discourse' or 'ideology', is preferable in order to avoid the debate on whether it constitutes ideology (Aslanidis 2016), a thin-centred ideology (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017) or a discourse. The main feature of populist discourse, according to preponderant conceptualizations in the literature, is the distinction between the homogenous 'benevolent majority of the people' and the 'malevolent' elites (Canovan 2004; Taggart 2004; Laclau 2005). For example, the inclusion vs. exclusion notion of populism, could explain why the losers of globalisation, would turn towards the East in the pursuit of equalitarianism and redemption.

In more recent times, one finds approaches that study Russophilia in the light of long-term trends of modern Greek political culture like populism. Petsinis (2016) also

concludes that Russophilia in Greece has been exacerbated by sentiments of frustration and disappointment with a West (EU) that imposed harsh bailout programmes to Greece. Nevertheless, Petsinis also sees a direct connection between Russophilia and national populism with the underdog syndrome and Greece's cultural dualism.

Without downplaying the implications of this phenomenon, Petsinis (ibid, 294) advances the idea that contrary to well-anchored types of Russophilia (i.e. Bulgaria and Serbia), the Greek type appears to be a side effect of Greece's ambivalent dispositions towards the West:

The actual knowledge of Russian politics ... is rather superficial and restricted. Russia is primarily seen as an actor that can regulate Western influence in a multipolar world order and its image among the Greek public remains that of a remote, yet not inimical, Eurasian 'Other'.

Petsinis' interpretation treats the Greek Russophile as a proxy rather than a concrete orientation of a strategic choice. He claims that this is a result of an underdog syndrome, invoking '(temporary and short-term) allies such as the "Serbian Orthodox brothers" in the 1990s, the "victimized Arab world" in the 2000s and, most recently, the, the "crisis-hit fellow South Europeans"' (ibid, 294).

Ioannidou (2015) examines Russophilia to interpret Greece's nationalist tendencies in the context of the economic crisis. She also links pro-Russian attitudes with a long-standing perception of victimization of Greece by the West, with the last episode being the bailout programmes. As she notes (Ioannidou 2012, 9): 'With the crisis, Russia took up the role of the 'good East' versus the 'bad West' which more and more intensively is represented by Europe and the EU'. When it comes to incorporating such attitudes into a larger interpretative scheme, Ioannidou (2012, 10) emphasizes perceptions with cultural and political connotations, namely the religious affinities and Vladimir Putin's charisma.

Russophilia as a set of attitudes through the prism of cultural dualism

From this perspective, the underdog mentality seems to involve deeper foundations and dimensions. It is this paper's proposition that it could help to reflect upon Russophilia on a firm basis. Furthermore, the more recent culmination of pro-Russian sentiments in Greece coincided with the economic crisis, the period of the bailout programmes and anti- EU and anti-German dispositions. This is a strong indication that it must be examined primarily through theories that deal macroscopically with the ambivalent relation of the political culture of Greece to the West.

In many ways, Diamantouros' cultural dualism theory appears to be one of the most pertinent. Instrumentally, the underdog culture could also shed light to more long-standing and structural traits. Probably the most indicative case regards the sentiments of anti-Americanism in the Greek political culture. Anti-Americanism became much more present in Greece in the period of Metapolitefsi with the following characteristics: it was embraced by both the Left and the Right, it fitted the paradigm of national-populism, it constructed a national narrative with electoral appeal and it incorporated irrational elements such as conspiracy theories. Also, it was modelled around a discourse of victimhood, such as traumas of the military dictatorship: 1967-1974, Turkey's military occupation of a part of Cyprus, 1974-today (Lialiouti 2010; Lialiouti 2016; Stephanidis 2010).

Another indication of the relevance of anti-Americanism to the underdog culture has been the tendency of Greek political parties and the media in both left and right spectres, to identify themselves with the victims of America, such as Palestinians or Serbs. This tendency has resulted in Greece being regarded as an exception among Western countries when it comes to the framing of landmark events, such as the Kosovo war (Kondopoulou 2002). However, it is important to note that in more recent years, in the period of the economic crisis, the US' mediation initiatives between Greece and its creditors (EU, IMF) was viewed very positively by Greek public opinion and the media. While this resulted in a sharp de-escalation of such dispositions, however another anti-sentiment emerged: anti-Germanism (Marantzidis and Siakas 2019).

The cultural dualism theory is a framework for capturing attitudes and beliefs as well as a deeper understanding of powers that bring change. Diamantouros' explanations provide a solid ground for understanding the historical roots and the identification of all the processes taking place in modern times. Approaching the underdog culture in more detail in the Greek language, one notes an inaccurate translation, as it provides a negative rather than a neutral connotation. Thus, in the Greek version of the cultural dualism framework, Diamantouros (2000) elaborates on the actual meaning of an underdog. One of the standpoints of our analysis lies on the justification of the validity of the term, from a theoretical point of view.

While critics underlined the negativity of the term underdog, underdog culture subtly reaches deeper nuances. It incorporates and justifies the sentiment of loss and disadvantage due to change and modernization. Thus, elements such as clientelism, corporatism and state-protectionism wouldn't be seen as an attempt to facilitate corruption, or fight meritocracy but as reactions to further loss. This way, the underdog culture explains a collective identity of the non-privileged, people that do not have or they feel that they do not have equal opportunities or they are not treated fairly. This leads to a sentiment of victimization with corruption being a means to an end, not

necessarily an intrinsic feature. Thus, the analytical capacity of the underdog vs. reformist theory of cultural dualism gives us new tools to understand motives and explain behaviours.

3. Empirical evidence

In this part we will firstly attempt to conceptualize the Greek Russophile's sentiments, distinguishing two different tiers, the soft Russophile and the hard-core, targeted Russophile, addressing *H1. There are distinct characteristics between the soft or superficial Russophiles and hard-core or hard-line Russophiles.* Secondly, on the basis of empirical evidence, we will address *H2. The hard-line Russophiles present a distinct set of attitudes and beliefs that fit into the underdog culture* by exploring the specific attitudes of the hard-core Russophile. In particular, the distinction between superficial and hard-core Russophile provides some analytical value as it explores differences between those that have a genuinely positive approach towards Russia, from those that adhere to a positive stereotype. Thus, we will provide empirical evidence from the nationwide polls that captured beliefs and attitudes of the Greek public opinion in 2016 and 2017. These polls confirm the underdog culture theory. Particularly, as the theory states, we expect a distinct and targeted behaviour. The premise of the theory will be valid, if the underdogs show paternalistic and anti-western values, while the reformists pursue modernization and adopt pro-western values.

3.1 Defining the hard-liners and the soft Russophiles (H1).

From the 2017 survey we could spot the positive attitudes towards Russia. Specifically, Russia, EU and UN have a positive outlook, while US and NATO share negative views. When the question comes to the attitude towards world leaders, then only Putin gathers positive views.

(Table 1 somewhere here)

As we take a closer look on those expressing themselves positively towards EU, we spot the following trend: those who have a positive view towards the EU, also share a positive view towards Russia. But, those who have a negative opinion towards the EU, share a positive view towards Russia ($\chi^2=32.51$, $df=4$, $p<0.05$). In other words, people who share a positive view towards the EU do not express themselves negatively

towards Russia. In contrast, people that have negative feelings towards the EU, share a positive disposition towards Russia.

(Table 2 somewhere here)

When the question changes frame and asks for specific strategic beliefs and perspectives, then the overall outlook becomes more concrete. On the question of the future strategic choice of Greece, although one out of two considers the enhancement of the relations with the EU member-states as the most important goal, there is a significant portion that supports other views. As it is depicted in Table 2, one out of four respondents choose the partnership with Russia, instead of other options. Thus, the favourable view towards Russia expressed by more than half of the respondents is not matched by a similar proportion when the question turns to a strategic orientation towards Russia. Such an attitude, which would entail a paradigm shift from the current EU-centric approach of the Greek policy, is supported by 24.5%.

(Table 3 somewhere here)

These data provide a ground for differentiating between the two groups. On the one hand, there is a strong indication for an overall positive attitude towards Russia, But, on the other, there are people that do not only show positive feelings and they manifest a targeted prompt for specific action. The contingency Table 3 elaborates on this argument. Those who suggest enhancing relations with the EU have a positive view about Russia (50.3% positive), while those who suggest enhancing relations with Russia, will share negative feelings towards the EU (63.3% negative). Supporting the current strategic orientation of Greece does not imply a negative view on Russia. But on the contrary, a strategic change option, by enhancing ties with Russia, implies a strong negative stance towards the EU ($\chi^2=109.191$, $df=8$, $p<0.05$).

The 2017 survey had some useful questions for understanding the cultural roots of the Russophile and elaborating on the explanatory nature of the cultural dualism theory. Table 4 presents the responses on the question of the rationality of the argument. While the majority shares a positive view towards Russia and there is a quite sizeable group of people that argue for a strategic cooperation with Russia, instead of the EU,

only a small percentage argues for choices that seem irrational. These include a potential professional reallocation to Russia, or a choice for an educational destination.

The results on the EU supporters enlighten our analysis. Those who believe that the strategic orientation of Greece is to enhance ties with EU member states, consider EU as the ideal place both for professional and educational purposes. But, this is also the case for Russophiles. Whilst one out of four respondents think that Greece should enhance ties with Russia, only one out of ten within this group would choose Russia as a country to study or live in.

(Tables 4 and 5 somewhere here)

It is of significant importance to realize that the connection with Russia seems cultural, rather than rational. Table 5 shows the difference between the overall outlook and the specific beliefs of hard-line Russophiles and EU supporters on the question of which country we have more in common and in which area. For example, the economic sector ties, do not justify the Russophile's choice. In essence, the majority of the hard-line Russophiles supports that Greece and EU member states have more in common than Greece and Russia. On other areas – history, cultural ties and geopolitical relations – the Russophiles' group adopts the exact opposite attitudes in comparison with the attitudes of the population. The EU supporters' group adopts similar positions with the population.

The above analysis distinguishes between soft or superficial Russophiles and hard-line Russophiles. Additionally, it provides a solid ground for a better understanding of the cultural dualism theory. Before we proceed to the different attitudes and beliefs that the hard-line Russophiles present in comparison to other population subgroups there are some remarks we would like to underline. The above distinction sheds light to the overall positive outlook that the Greek public opinion presents towards Russia. Despite the positive views depicted in the time series presented by the Pew Research, this does not present any difference compared to the population. The roots of the superficial Russophile also need some elaboration, but the important task is to understand the hard-line Russophiles. This follows in the next section. We will focus on the group of the hard-liners, e.g. those who not only express a favourable view towards Russia but also wish for a change in the strategic orientation of Greece, more precisely the breaking of ties with the EU and the development of a special relation with Russia.

3.2 The hard-liners as underdogs (H2).

This part will provide empirical evidence in support of the underdog theory. In particular, the underdog theory dictates that the two antagonistic groups should present distinct behaviours, so this should become apparent on strategic choices and values. Notwithstanding the rationale of the formulation of the distinct character of these narratives, we argue that the distinction between hard-line and soft-line Russophiles provides adequate ground for the support of the underdog theory. The pro-Western vs. pro-Russian orientation, along with the strategic placement, the dilemmas on strategic relations as well as the values towards democracy and democratic participation vary significantly. Also, on the basis of a sociological analysis, we will identify different demographic groups, as supporters of one or the other position.

(Table 6 somewhere here)

The underdog theory implies the cultural difference and the homogeneity of both groups in term of values and orientation. The empirical data presented provided evidence for many of the elements that the theory predicted. Of course, there were also characteristics where the differences, although significant, didn't provide any explanatory value. Such case was the income level, or the left-right placement. In other words, while the theory predicts the existence of two different 'worlds', there are instances where there aren't actually two worlds. But, this doesn't undermine the value of the theory. As the empirical evidence suggest, there are crosscutting issues, where the difference could be explained by this cultural dualism approach.

The 2016 survey gives us the chance to test the theory in respect to the existence of distinct behaviours and attitudes. We will do that with respect to four different dimensions: (1) attitudes towards the EU, (2) Opinions of the globalization, (3) Issues on the acceptance of people from different cultures, (4) Beliefs about national identity and the identity of the contemporary Greek, (5) The acceptance or the denial of mainstream conspiracy theories, and (6) the socio-demographic profile of the distinct groups. All the above, provide a distinct depiction and a statistically significant difference between the two groups.

(Table 7 somewhere here)

Starting from the approach towards the participation in the EU, the Russophiles are clearly more negatively oriented than the pro-EU supporters. In particular, the pro-EU supporters assess positively Greece's participation in the EU and regard the EU as a progressive alliance in which Greece should remain a part of. In contrast, Russophiles adopt the exact opposite stance (a. $\chi^2=227.407$, $df=16$, $p<0.05$, b. $\chi^2=260.292$, $df=8$, $p<0.05$). Also, the same pattern regards the benefits Greece gained from the participation in the union. Russophiles support that the participation of Greece benefited the EU, while the pro-EU supporters consider Greece as the one that has benefited ($\chi^2=255.224$, $df=16$, $p<0.05$). Additionally, regarding the future perspective of the union and the matter of convergence, the Russophiles adopted a rigid stance, denying this possibility. On the contrary, the pro-EU supporters consider it as a probability. In fact, their responses on this matter present a trichotomy ($\chi^2=94.289$, $df=12$, $p<0.05$).

The second standpoint is about views on globalization. Cultural dualism theory also suggests two distinct and opposite standpoints. The empirical evidence reveals a rigid negative stance, adopted by the Russophiles, while the pro-EU supporters do not posit themselves clearly. Also, in a statistical significance difference ($\chi^2=105.085$, $df=8$, $p<0.05$), Russophiles regard globalization more as a threat rather than an opportunity (73% - 23.3%), while the pro-EU supports are divided (43.2% - 48.9%).

The third set of findings deals with tolerance and the acceptance of people from different cultures. We will focus on two questions. The first considers the behaviour towards immigrants and refugees. It is noticeable that the Greek public opinion is not in favour of a full and unconditional integration. This is valid for both EU supporters and Russophiles. Secondly, a significant difference comes from the different views on the options of an immediate expulsion -supported more by Russophiles (28.5%) and less from EU supporters (14.0%)- and from the choice of a gradual incorporation - supported more from EU supporters (24.6%) rather than Russophiles (10.9%)- ($\chi^2=81.608$, $df=20$, $p<0.05$). Another difference is apparent in the degree of the support of same sex marriages. Russophiles' score is 41.8% positive against 56.1% negative, while pro-EU supporters adopt the opposite approach. In essence, same-sex marriage is supported by 57.1% and opposed by 39.8%. Interestingly enough, when the question comes to the adoption of children, then it seems that this discrepancy becomes narrower. In essence, Russophiles disagree with this (21% positive vs. 78.5% negative) while EU-supporters are a bit more positive, without changing the overall outlook (30% positive vs. 67.9%).

The fourth set of arguments relates to characteristics that form the national identity. Specifically, on the principal question, whether 'You could become, or you should be born Greek', the two distinct attitudes share the exact opposite approach.

Russophiles believe that ‘you are born Greek’ (61.1%), while pro-EU supporters consider that ‘You become Greek’ (60.1%). These two approaches cover the agenda of tolerance extraversion. The argument for the ‘natural, born Greek’ aims at setting a borderline, leaving aside non-natural, born Greeks, such as immigrants, refugees, etc. Table 8, presents the basic characteristics, as they are perceived, that correspond to the contemporary identity of a modern Greek by the dichotomy of Russophiles and EU-supporters.

(Tables 8 and 9 somewhere here)

The fifth dimension is about the adoption of major conspiracy theories. The survey included two main conspiracy arguments. The first one, that some secret global organizations around the world are responsible for the world order is supported by nearly nine out of ten (88.5%) Russophiles, while it is also supported -with smaller share- by seven out of ten pro-EU supporters (71.8%) ($\chi^2=68.111$, $df=8$, $p<0.05$). The second conspiracy theory concerns the air-trails of the airplanes and specifically whether they are a natural phenomenon or chem-trails. As it’s clear in Table 9, Russophiles are divided, whereas pro-EU supporters adopt a clear stance favouring the air-trails argument ($\chi^2=122.497$, $df=8$, $p<0.05$).

Moreover, the demographic characteristics of the two groups differ. In particular, we examine age groups, educational level and income. Also, we place responses in a left-right self-placement frame. In principle, hard-line Russophila is more commonly found among younger age groups, rather than older ($\chi^2=16.948$, $df=8$, $p<0.05$). An additional difference is captured in the education level differentiation ($\chi^2=73.004$, $df=12$, $p<0.05$). Russophiles are not as educated as the pro-EU supporters, with the majority of Russophiles having a secondary educational certification while the pro-EU supporters are considered better educated (50.8% University education and 15.7% post-graduates).

Differences were also detected in the income level of the two groups. While the differences do not imply a huge gap, the income variable points at noticeable differentiations. Lower income group (0-1000 euro per month) supported the Russophile stance while the EU supporters exceed the threshold of one thousand (1000) euro. A better understanding is provided when we see the allocation per the self-assessment of the economic situation. The people fitting into the Russophile stances express the difficulty in dealing with household finances or struggling to manage. The

pro-EU supporters have a similar distribution, with the majority seemingly exceeding the threshold of tackling with major difficulties.

(Table 10 somewhere here)

Finally, the overall distribution of each group in the LR placement axis is not self-explanatory. A noteworthy element lies on the share of those that are not affiliated with a specific placement in the axis. It is important to underline that this response is normally spontaneous and seems alternative to the typical response of the affiliation to the centre. So, those who responded accordingly had declined any other affiliation.

Conclusions

This paper aimed at exploring the phenomenon of Russophilia in contemporary Greece on the basis of empirical evidence, using opinion polls conducted in 2016 and 2017, and through the scope of the influential framework of cultural dualism. The purpose of our study was not to elaborate on the cultural dualism theory, but to use it as a standpoint for the interpretation and exploration of a set of distinct behaviours and beliefs. We were able to verify whether categorizations such as the soft or the hard-line Russophile can be valid and determine a set of defining traits and characteristics compatible with the underdog theory framework. This already contributes to a more systematic knowledge on Russophilia in Greece while enhances and facilitates further approaches and studies.

The empirical evidence confirms H1 and validates the difference between two distinct but not homogenous groups. The emphasis placed by Diamantouros on the difference between the underdog culture and the reformist culture is also justified from the data. In contrast, the same evidence does not seem to support the bypassing of the cultural dualism theory and the idea, suggested by scholars, of a coexistence of these elements in different values and mentalities. Furthermore, the empirical evidence largely supports the premise of the underdog culture theory that specific population groups would be anti-Western, anti-liberal, intolerant, and introverted. Apparently, there are clear differences among various approaches and hardly a uniform approach on all the issues.

The empirical evidence also supports certain shortcomings of the theory and validates H2 since hard-line Russophiles present a distinct set of attitudes and beliefs that fit in the underdog culture. Assuming, for instance, that the two antagonist groups of reformers and underdogs form a dichotomy is an exaggeration of the analytical capacity of the cultural dualism theory. Actually, this is not a dichotomy. Statistically speaking, the portion of hard-line Russophiles varies from the one fourth to the one third of the population. Apparently, this does not form a clear division as some may believe. Additionally, inside these antagonistic groups, attitudes and perceptions don't formulate uniform or concrete stances. In other words, there are majorities and minorities that are being formed. The merit of the cultural dualism theory and especially the elements of the underdog culture is its capacity to explain –or even predict– the arguments that will be supported by the majority of each group.

The findings do attest to the existence of cultural aspects when it comes to the Russophile current in the Greek public opinion along the lines of Diamantouros' theory. However, it is only when one considers more specific traits and attitudes, and particularly the distinction between superficial and hard-line, that the scope and the extent of the phenomenon is in a better display. In other words, we found that Russophilia is not a homogenous and compact set of cultural and political ideas. On the contrary, it seems that a first level of superficial attitudes exists but without proposing irrational and radical options (i.e., develop ties with Russia and jeopardize those with Western counterparts).

According to our findings, there is a more restrained portion of the Greek public opinion for which Russia can be indeed such an alternative. Interestingly enough, this group does seem to share a number of traits, such as the negative stance towards the EU, the globalization and multiculturalism and a tendency for conspiracy theories. However, as already noted, these traits should be read more as propensities and predispositions rather than clear-cut and definite features that, by definition, characterize the positive disposition towards Russia.

The hard-line Russophilia seems to embody elements that seem hardly compatible with the pro-Western and pro-reformist attitudes described in Diamantouros' theory. Further research is needed to prove whether in the Greek case the rejection of such elements is more structurally affiliated with Russia (i.e. explicit preference for Russia's political, social and economic system over the Western) or incidental. Our study indicates that the rise in Russophile dispositions did coincide with a period during which many economic, political and even social reforms were not only needed and negotiated in the Greek public discussions and political debates but also imposed by the EU and presented as conditions for the country's economic recovery.

Thus, one might think that the positive perception of Russia is another manifestation of the underdog syndrome in the sense of a perception of victimhood that made Greeks turn towards someone who could offer a safe haven or rather an illusion of safety. This attitude consists of a key feature of the underdog culture. It shows that though perceived as a clear-cut pole, the underdog is much more nuanced and multi-layered. It is also in that respect that it seems to stand along such traits as clientelism or statism, in other words, as a remedy to a problem. (i.e. tension in relations with the West). The political culture framework and especially the cultural dualism theory provide a useful and elaborate framework for understanding the Greek Russophile. This overtly positive outlook towards Russia necessitates further study.

Overall, this paper dug deeper and distinguished the overall positive trends of the targeted and hard-core Russophilia. On the one hand, the positive outlook may vary and concern more than half of the population. On the other hand, the hard-core Russophile may vary from the one fourth to the one third of the population. Both the superficial and the hard-line Russophile should be understood in principle by the values and the overall cultural elements, rather the rational or the strategic reasoning. Especially, as regards the former, the Russophile elements are by far not rational. While a hard-line Russophile would accept a strategic change in the orientation of the Greek foreign policy – choosing to enhance ties with Russia, instead of maintaining the current status quo as an EU member state – at the same time, he or she would choose an EU or US educational institute for their children.

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Tables

Table 1. Public opinion stance towards actors and states. ‘Do you have a positive or negative feeling towards ...’ – 15-17 September 2017

	Positive	Negative
EU	56.5	42.1
USA	41.5	51.5
NATO	41.7	51.0
Russia	57.6	33.6
UN	62.7	30.9
President Putin	67.1	24.9
Chancellor Merkel	40.3	56.2
President Trump	16.5	73.2

Table 2. Public opinion stance towards potential strategic choices. ‘Greece should enhance its alliance in the future with...’ - 15-17 September 2017

	%
EU member states	47.5
USA	8.8
Russia	24.5
NATO countries	7.8
DK/DA	11.4

Table 3. Cross tabulation of positive/negative attitudes, according to potential strategic choices. acc. - 15-17 September 2017

Enhance relations with	towards EU		towards Russia	
	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative
EU member states	69.2	29.6	50.3	39.2
USA	64.8	34.1	56.7	40.0
Russia	35.1	63.3	80.9	13.5
NATO countries	68.8	30.0	55.0	38.8
DK/DA	35.0	62.4	39.3	45.3

Table 4. Rationality of potential decisions, 15-17 September 2017

	Which country would you choose... for employment		
	EU	US	Russia
Population	64.8	20.8	4.2
Ties with EU MS	74.1	18.1	0.8
Ties with Russia	54.8	18.8	13.2
Positive view on Russia	63.9	25.8	5.1
	Which Country would you choose... your children’s education		
	EU	US	Russia
Population	67.6	23.4	3.7

Ties with EU MS	75.4	21.6	1.0
Ties with Russia	59.8	21.1	10.4
Positive view on Russia	62.0	22.4	6.3

Table 5. The actor/entity that shares most common ties with Greece, 15-17 September 2017

Cultural Ties				
	Population	Positive view of Russia ± 1	Ties with EU MS *1	Ties with Russia *1
EU member states	63.0	56.0	78.9	34.3
US	2.0	1.9	1.6	1.6
Russia	27.7	35.5	15.2	56.6
Economic Interests				
	Population	Positive view of Russia ± 2	Ties with EU MS *2	Ties with Russia *2
EU member states	64.1	57.4	82.8	42.6
US	5.8	5.9	3.7	2.8
Russia	16.1	23.1	6.2	37.5
Geopolitical Interests				
	Population	Positive view of Russia ± 3	Ties with EU MS *3	Ties with Russia *3
EU member states	54.8	50.3	73.2	31.5
US	7.7	8.0	4.7	6.4
Russia	23.4	29.7	13.7	51.0
History				
	Population	Positive view of Russia ± 4	Ties with EU MS *4	Ties with Russia *4
EU member states	58.3	55.6	75.2	33.2
US	1.8	1.2	1.0	0.8
Russia	30.2	34.6	18.9	52.4

*1 ($\chi^2=208.931$, $df=12$, $p<0.05$), *2 ($\chi^2=387.599$, $df=12$, $p<0.05$), *3 ($\chi^2=295.240$, $df=12$, $p<0.05$), *4 ($\chi^2=177.255$, $df=12$, $p<0.05$)

± 1 $\chi^2=45.651$, $df=6$, $p<0.05$, ± 2 $\chi^2=54.153$, $df=6$, $p<0.05$, ± 3 $\chi^2=33.262$, $df=6$, $p<0.05$, ± 4 $\chi^2=22.987$, $df=6$, $p<0.05$

Table 6. Cross tabulation of the assessment of Greece's overall EU's membership, according to potential strategic choices (30 November – 1 December 2016)

Strategic relations	EU accession Positive	Negative	EU expresses interests not to Greece's benefit	Is a progressive alliance and Greece must be a member of it
In the monetary Union	79.6	19.8	22.8	73.7
With Russia	38.6	60.4	69.9	27.5
Strategic relations	Greece's participation in the EU		Benefitting both	Neither benefited
In the monetary Union	Benefitting Greece	Benefitting EU	10.9	2.9
With Russia	13.6	76.9	4.2	4.4
Strategic relations	EU and Greece's convergence		Instead of convergence, the gap will widen	
In the monetary Union	Is feasible and will sooner or later occur	Greece cannot reduce the gap	30.2	
With Russia	30.4	36.5	30.2	
	13.0	29.2	53.5	

Table 7. Cross tabulation on tolerance and attitudes towards refugees and immigrants, according to potential strategic choices. (30 November – 1 December 2016)

Strategic relations	Immigrants and refugees should...				
	be fully incorporated into Greek society	be incorporated gradually, under terms and conditions	stay in detention centres	be expelled immediately	be sent on to the country of their choice
In the monetary Union	2.5	24.6	21.9	14.0	35.2
With Russia	2.1	10.9	18.5	28.5	38.9

Strategic relations	Would you agree on building religious temples and facilities of other religions?	
	No	Yes
In the monetary Union	32.3	67
With Russia	54.2	45.3

Table 8. A Greek should... (according to potential strategic choices) – 30 November – 1 December 2016

Strategic relations: With Russia	Strategic relations: In the monetary Union
adopt Greek customs and values (48.4%)	Adopt Greek customs and values (58.9%)
be born to Greek parents (43.3%)	speak Greek (36.7%)
be Christian Orthodox (26.2%)	be born to Greek parents (32.4%)
be born in Greece (25.2%)	be born in Greece (24.4%)
speak Greek (19.2%)	live in Greece (12.3%)
live in Greece (9.5%)	be Christian Orthodox (10.9%)

Table 9. Conspiracy theories and potential strategic choices – 30 November – 1 December 2016

Strategic relations:	What are the visual marks in the sky following aircraft?		
	Natural vapours	Chem-trails	DK/DA
In the monetary Union	77.9	12.5	9.6
With Russia	46.5	41.0	12.5

Table 10. Left-right placement according to potential strategic choices – 30 November – 1 December 2016

Strategic relations:	L	CL	C	CR	R	N/af	DK
In the monetary Union	11.8	21.0	22.9	22.9	11.4	7.5	2.5
With Russia	16	14.4	22.7	14.1	11.5	18.8	2.5