Metaphors Matter: The Ideological Functions of the Kosovo-Holocaust Analogy

Abstract
The Kosovo-Holocaust analogy is normally examined either as a rhetorical tool of deception and propaganda, or as an argumentative device employed to serve diverse purposes with often conflicting meanings. Political objections are thus normally limited to disclosing the distortions that served the national interests of the intervener. Following Paul Ricoeur, the paper moves beyond mere distortion to the ideological functions (social integration, legitimization and distortion) of a wider social imaginary, a Holocaust metanarrative for understanding the war, evaluating the facts and ethically assessing the proper U.S. response. Findings are based on exhaustive research into (a) public remarks and statements made by Secretary Albright and leading figures of the Department of State (1997-2001), (b) the Congressional Record during the Clinton and G.W. Bush’s administrations, and (c) the public papers of the U.S. Presidents during the same period (1993-2009).

Keywords: Holocaust analogy; Kosovo; metaphor; social imaginary; Paul Ricoeur

Metaphors gain importance in times of uncertainty. Since the promulgation of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide the Holocaust heritage has been the lodestone of post-war humanitarian law. More recently the Holocaust analogy has functioned as the ideological basis for a cosmopolitan ethic, as well as for a principle legitimizing humanitarian intervention in a ‘just war’. This development appears to be not only legally problematic, but also quite unsettling. Although in the West the Holocaust marks an extreme limit, this analogizing process is easier than one would expect for two reasons: First, it does not presuppose the factual, complete and proven repetition of the Holocaust horrors, the prevention of which is the aim of a ‘legitimized’ intervention. Second, the deep resonance of the Holocaust in Western societies is connected not only with the ethico-political dimensions of human abhorrence, but also with an oversimplified distinction between innocent victims and guilty perpetrators.

Holocaust analogies have been extensively used in Western (mostly American) governmental rhetoric on Kosovo to serve diverse purposes and with often conflicting meanings. It is impossible to know with a reasonable degree of certainty whether members
of Congress, State Department officials, or the President himself employed these analogies merely as propaganda, or whether they were themselves convinced about the similarity. It should be noted, however, that some of the key actors have repeatedly acknowledged the impact of past events on their own understanding, such as the self-avowed impact of the Rwanda genocide on President Bill Clinton and that of the Munich fiasco on Secretary Madeleine Albright. In the American case, this may even sound like a truism, given the deep impact of the ‘lessons of history’ on its own self-realization in popular consciousness. Furthermore, the Holocaust analogy itself poses particular challenges, given the role of the Holocaust narrative in American popular culture.

More often than not, political objections to NATO’s intervention in Kosovo were focused on the danger of abusing the very right to intervene for humanitarian purposes. Criticism has been limited to unveiling the untrue, exaggerated or hypocritical accusations of mass violations of human rights. Following a materialist (‘Marxist’) or realist perspective, criticism in the discipline of International Relations – with minor exemptions – has been limited to the disclosure of ideological distortions, which serve the national interests of the intervening powers. Nevertheless, this kind of criticism is successful only when it demonstrates that the Kosovo-Holocaust analogy is historically inaccurate or purposely untrue.

Hence on that view a political metaphor or a historical analogy such as the Holocaust one is accurate, true or appropriate only if it passes a verificationist test. Herein lies the central analytical paradox. The analyst can only examine in a literal manner the correspondence between facts that are metaphorically related. In other words, the analysis turns on whether the atrocities committed in Kosovo are truly the same as the ones committed during the Holocaust, or at least similar enough such that the resort to force is justified. Such an approach, however, neglects what Paul Ricoeur has described as the ‘poetic capacity’ of
metaphorical language, that is, the power of metaphor to create a ‘surplus of meaning’ by establishing similarity between things previously considered dissimilar.

Following Ricoeur and concurring with the recent rhetorical ‘turn’ in political thought with an emphasis on the topical and the political, I suggest that metaphors do matter; that the exploration of the Kosovo-Holocaust analogy should focus more on the functions of the metaphor than on its content, more on disclosing the ideological roots of the historically and culturally specific social imaginary emerging from and giving rise to such metaphors, than on establishing an exact correspondence – or lack of correspondence – between Kosovo and the Holocaust. In the analysis which follows, I describe this social imaginary in terms of a universal and all-encompassing narrative, a metanarrative for understanding the war, evaluating the facts and ethically assessing the proper U.S. response. Following Ricoeur, I suggest that like any social imaginary, the Holocaust metanarrative pertained to three key ideological functions: integration, legitimization and distortion. My findings are based on exhaustive research into (a) public remarks and statements made by Secretary Albright and other leading figures of the Department of State (1997-2001), (b) the Congressional Record during the Clinton and G.W. Bush’s administrations, and (c) the public papers of the U.S. Presidents during the same period (1993-2009).

Metaphors and the Hermeneutics of the Social Imaginary

Political inquiry has traditionally focused on how we come to know political reality and whether metaphors function as literal predications or accurate representations of this. However it has recently been argued that metaphor should not be dismissed as a rhetorical ornament, but should instead be studied as a dynamic means of political conceptualization. Categorizing traditional approaches to political metaphors, Eugene Miller has proposed a distinction between verificationist and constitutivist views. Verificationists argue that the
likeness evoked through metaphors should be verifiable and empirically testable in political reality. Hence a good metaphor is one that contributes to an operational model that can generate empirically verifiable hypotheses.\textsuperscript{17} Metaphors that do not exemplify these standards ‘remain outside the scientific domain quite impregnable to the tests of experience’.\textsuperscript{18} By contrast, for constitutivists metaphors should be treated instead as the organizing principle of political reality.\textsuperscript{19} Constitutivists differentiate between the similitude of analogies and the creative elements of metaphor by embracing ‘tension theories’ in linguistic analysis. Thus the creative capacity of metaphor is born not only from ‘collusion’ between two entities, but foremost from their ‘collision’.\textsuperscript{20}

The verificationist and the constitutivist approaches suggest that either we treat reality as the safest validity check for the accuracy of our metaphors, or that we treat reality as ultimately arbitrary, depending solely on the metaphors we employ to construct it. Thus we evaluate metaphors as useful and appropriate depending on either (a) their representational efficacy in relation to the political reality they discover, or (b) whether the political realities they create serve the interests of those who deploy them. However, with this kind of reasoning one has to choose between the creation or discovery of political reality, and neither option explains how metaphors become meaningful in the first place. In order to overcome this seemingly unsurpassable binarism between creation and discovery, the analytical move proposed here is from the study of the individual instance of political metaphor to the hermeneutics of the social imaginary, which involves a) a treatment of imagination as a dimension of language, and b) an acknowledgment of the creative power of metaphorical imagination.

Being regarded as a form of vision, a way of seeing the world, imagination has always played a central role in the phenomenological tradition. With imagination understood in a perceptive and rather descriptive way in the works of Husserl, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, the
The act of imagining is respectively described as a ‘neutralised’, ‘unrealised’, or ‘dialectical’ way of seeing. It was not until the hermeneutic turn in phenomenology, the turn of focus from description (Wesenschau) to interpretation (Verstehen), that imagination was seen in linguistic terms as a semantic innovation, and was assessed ‘as an indispensible agent in the creation of meaning in and through language.’

In my view, the most systematic explication of such a hermeneutics of imagination should be traced in Paul Ricoeur’s work that followed Le Symbolique du mal (1960) – from La métaphore vive (1975) to the third volume of his Temps et récit (1985) and his Lectures on Ideology and Utopia (1981) – which opened up the possibility not only for a linguistic appreciation of imagination but also for an acknowledgement of the creative capacity of its functions (symbols, myths, metaphors, poems, narratives, and ideologies). As Ricoeur notably puts it:

—are we not ready to recognise in the power of imagination, no longer the faculty of deriving ‘images’ from our sensory experience, but the capacity for letting new worlds shape our understanding of ourselves? This power would not be conveyed by images, but by the emergent meanings in our language. Imagination would thus be treated as a dimension of language. In this way a new link would appear between imagination and language.

Of course this was not the first time that the linguistic dimensions of imagination were studied. Although in a less systematic way, Gaston Bachelard for example had already contributed to this in La poétique de la reverie (1960). Yet, the major contribution on this issue should be traced back in what Cornelius Castoriadis has called ‘the rediscovery of the Kantian discovery and retreat’, that is, Martin Heidegger’s existential-hermeneutic critique of ‘transcendental imagination’ as developed in the first edition of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.

In his Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (1929), Heidegger suggested that Kant established a ‘productive’ role for imagination that antecedes both sensation and
understanding, as their sine qua non and, in Kant’s terms, ‘originarius’ precondition. The result is, according to Heidegger, that along with its reproductive function, Kant acknowledged imagination’s productive role through the production of images without relying merely on the ones produced by sensory experience. For Heidegger, Kant’s revolutionary claims could lead nowhere but in a complete reversal of the priorities of Western metaphysics. This is the reason why Kant resiled in the second edition of his *Critique of Pure Reason*, by having rewritten and removed several crucial passages from the initial text concerning the primacy of imagination over reason. As Heidegger dramatically describes this Kantian dilemma, ‘by his radical interrogation, Kant brought the ‘possibility’ of metaphysics before this abyss. He saw the unknown; he had to draw back.’

As noted above, Castoriadis shares Heidegger’s claim about this Kantian retreat. Even more interestingly, he does not consider Heidegger to have elaborated a sufficient account of creativity. Admittedly, Castoriadis’ own views on the social imaginary and its *ex nihilo* creative powers with respect to the idea of autonomy remain hard to surpass. Nevertheless, although he did develop a theory of signification, especially in *L’institution imaginaire de la société* (1975), he did not turn primarily to language-philosophy. His rejection of hermeneutics on both a philosophical and a cultural base or, better, the fact that the interpretive element of creative imagination is not acknowledged in his ontology further attests to that.

As mentioned above, it was not until Ricoeur’s *Symbolism of Evil* that imagination has been hermeneutically discussed as a dimension of language. With this shift of focus from the visual towards the verbal aspect of imagination, Ricoeur attempts to affirm what he calls the poetic function of imagination, that is, its ability to say something in terms of something else thus creating something altogether new in the process of what has been referred to as ‘semantic innovation’. By creating new meanings, imagination escapes in this semantic
innovation the Sartrean reef of nothingness, of being reduced to a mere negation of the perceptual, real world.

Building upon and expanding Kant’s concept of productive imagination, Ricoeur begins his overall discussion of metaphor with Aristotle’s definition in the Poetics.29 There metaphor is explored both as a process of transferring a word from one object of reference to another, and also as a given word, a product of this process of metapherein. This process of transference is based on thinking and seeing the likeness (theorein to omoion)30 between semantic fields previously considered dissimilar for, as Ricoeur notes, ‘[t]o see the like is to see the same in spite of, and through, the different’.31 Focusing on the function rather than the content of metaphors, Ricoeur treats imagination poetically as ‘the capacity of language to open up new worlds’ which ‘transcend the limits of our actual world’.32

It is through the confrontation between the literal and the figurative33 that new meanings emerge.34 To render the notion of tension more intelligible, let us take the Kosovo-Holocaust analogy as an example. One may see the Kosovo case in Holocaustal terms. One may see, that is, that Milosevic’s policy was similar to Hitler’s, that Serbian tactics were similar to those of the Nazis, that the atrocities committed against the Kosovar Albanians were similar to ones suffered by Jews during the Holocaust. One knows, of course, that Milosevic was not Hitler, that the Serbs are not Nazis and that the Kosovar Albanians are not Jews. Nevertheless, by saying that all these things were so, by evoking these imaginative depictions and metaphorical resemblances, one affirms that they were so indeed, but at the figurative level. What we have here is thus a certain thinking in ‘excess’, which is both a seeing and a saying more, a penser plus that brings life, so to speak, to the metaphor through a semantic innovation.

This poetic capacity of metaphors brings forth the relation between language and reality. Ricoeur is adamant: ‘Through this recovery of the capacity of language to create and
recreate, we discover reality itself in the process of being created." Nevertheless, if we follow Ricoeur’s view that both language and reality are metamorphosed in parallel, how does this refiguring of the world of action become socially meaningful? Answering this question presupposes a double analytical move: first, an analytical progression to the social imaginary; and second, a ‘regressive analysis’ of ideology beyond its surface definition as mere distortion. This presupposes a treatment of ideology more as a form of socially constructed world-view than as a system of ideas solely relating to the interests of a social class.

Following Ricoeur hermeneutics of metaphoricity and drawing from his Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, I suggest that the extensive employment of Holocaust metaphors in official American rhetoric during the Kosovo war corresponded to a social imaginary pertaining to ideological functions beyond distortion, namely those of legitimization and integration. This imaginary did not merely provide a distorted view of the Kosovo war. To be precise, this distorted view was possible because the imaginary had already functioned at the levels of legitimization and integration. By virtue of its legitimizing function, this social imaginary filled the gap between the claim to and the belief in the legitimacy of intervening. As will become evident in the next section, this move allowed an endless repetition of the stereotypes that the imaginary has already legitimized, leading to ‘a stagnation of politics’.

Neither distortion nor legitimization would have been possible, however, if this imaginary had not functioned in an integrating and legitimizing manner in the first place. By virtue of its symbolic power, this imaginary provided a socially meaningful understanding of the war and of the proper American response. It was because this social imaginary had already functioned symbolically that it could function as distortion.

In the next section, I will examine the use of the Kosovo-Holocaust analogy during the Kosovo war. My purpose is neither to provide an alternative historical account of the war, nor
to relativize the crimes committed or the suffering caused. Moreover, I am not analysing the analogies drawn by members of the U.S. executive and legislative bodies as expressions of a distorting rhetoric. Instead, I argue that these analogies pertain to a historically and culturally specific social imaginary, the functions of which range from distortion to legitimization and on to integration.

**The Kosovo-Holocaust Analogy**

The Kosovo war was received in the West as an echo of the Bosnian tragedy. As the Serbian policy of ethnic-cleansing escalated in Bosnia, the Western media published photos and eyewitness testimonies recalling images of the mass crimes committed by the Nazis. Indeed, in the Bosnian case, the West remained inactive up until the time when Holocaust symbolism began to generate concern. The turning point was in 1992, when Western journalists started reporting not from the battlefield but from ‘concentration camps’, publishing photos of starving prisoners. By the mid-1990s, the case of Bosnia had already registered in the collective memory of the West as the first case of failed appeasement and consequent genocide on European soil since World War II. At the same time, the case of Rwanda was cited as a dreadful reminder of the consequences of inaction. In the Kosovo case, the massacre of 45 ethnic Albanians in Racak by Serb soldiers marked a new turning point. Describing the atrocities committed against Kosovar Albanians, the first media reports from the refugee camps in neighbouring countries foretold a spread of the Bosnian horrors, describing crimes similar to those the Nazis justified as reprisals.

**The U.S. Executive Branch of Government**

By 25 March 1999, the day after the inauguration of NATO’s air strikes against Yugoslavia, Secretary Albright had already set the dominant ideological frame for understanding the war
by analogically relating the Kosovo case to developments on the eve of World War II. Milosevic’s tactics were set in parallel with Hitler’s policy of Lebensraum, and the obligation of the West to respond was described as guided by the lessons of Munich. A month later, in her statements before Senate and House committees, Secretary Albright referred to ‘ominous aerial photos of freshly-upturned earth’ and ‘images of families uprooted and put on trains’, recalling memories of massive deportations and mass graves during the Holocaust. Haunted by the ghost of the European policy of appeasement, Albright admitted: ‘My mindset is Munich.’

This Munich symbolism did not merely function as a reminder of the consequences of Western inaction, but also as a guide for NATO’s current and future foreign policy. In her remarks at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. on the future of NATO, Secretary Albright described it as the West’s response to the lessons of Munich and the Holocaust. Although she did not explicitly compare Milosevic to Hitler or declare that the Kosovo crisis was identical to that of Munich or to the Holocaust itself, her language guided the audience towards an analogical relationship between the two historical incidents. Already part of a long genealogy of evil, Milosevic was readily presented as the personification of ethnic cleansing. Secretary Albright often repeated that by confronting dictators like Milosevic, the West was fighting not so much the war criminals themselves as the ideologies underlying their crimes.

The impact of Albright’s historical analogies on the U.S. administration’s convictions and policies in Bosnia and Kosovo is nicely summarized by then Under Secretary of State, Stuart E. Eizenstat: ‘It was she who led the charge within the Administration to make NATO relevant to post-Cold War realities and who incorporated the lessons of World War II and the Holocaust by stemming Serbian aggression in Bosnia and in Kosovo together with our European allies. Now that we together won that war, together we must win this peace as we
did after World War II.\textsuperscript{51} After the conclusion of the negotiations at Rambouillet in France, the Holocaust analogies multiplied,\textsuperscript{52} shaping a context for an international response to the aggression of dictators like Milosevic.

As noted above, Kosovo was not the first case when American policies were formed, guided and even justified to national and international publics by way of historical analogies to World War II, the Munich fiasco and the Holocaust. For example, the impact of those great lessons of history on President Truman’s decision to intervene in Korea in 1950 has been both witnessed in his memoirs\textsuperscript{53} and extensively discussed in the historical literature.\textsuperscript{54} What is of interest in the context of this analysis, however, is the symbolic function of this episode. Truman’s decision, like so many similar others reached from Korea to Kosovo, contributed to the cumulative symbolic force of future analogies and the intensification of their legitimizing powers. In other words, the historical verification of the ‘truth’ of the historical lesson of Munich, and, by extension, the legitimization of the American involvement in Kosovo, could now be traced just as clearly to the failure of appeasement and to further decisions that were encompassed by this analogy. As President Clinton (1998a) often remarked, ‘if you think about what Harry Truman did 50 years ago, … it gives you some guidance in terms of what we ought to be doing today’.\textsuperscript{55}

Even the President’s initiative to fight racism at home offered a supplementary, albeit misaligned vocabulary for a racialized reading of an ethnic conflict. This reading may have facilitated the legitimization of the oncoming intervention, but it also intensified confusion relating to the particularities of the Kosovo case. It is a particularly striking fact that the understanding of the Kosovo case in racial terms facilitated the development of the Holocaust analogy within the wider ideological context of the ‘Nazification’ of the Serbs. As President Clinton noted:
I think in the 21st century – when you go back to World War II, and you think about the part of the Nazi experience that was directed against the Jews, and you look all the way through the ensuing years, all the way to the end of this century, down to what we’ve seen in Rwanda, the Middle East, Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Kosovo – you name it – it will be incumbent upon the United States to be a force for tolerance and racial reconciliation for the foreseeable future.\textsuperscript{56}

On 23 March 1999 President Clinton posed the most important, and most often quoted rhetorical questions that guided the American response to the Kosovo war, notably combining the Munich and Holocaust analogies:

What if someone had listened to Winston Churchill and stood up to Adolph Hitler earlier? How many people’s lives might have been saved? And how many American lives might have been saved? … This is not the first time … we’ve faced this kind of choice. When President Milosevic started the war in Bosnia 7 years ago, the world did not act quickly enough to stop him. Let’s don’t forget what happened … Now, this was a genocide in the heart of Europe. It did not happen in 1945; it was going on in 1995.\textsuperscript{57}

Irrespective of the President’s personal beliefs, his rhetoric outlined the symbolic context for understanding a complex and horrible war in a country that seemed exotic to the eyes of the average American citizen. Although few could easily locate Kosovo on the European map, virtually no one could ignore the severity of an ethnic cleansing recalling the Holocaust.

Announcing NATO’s air strikes in his televised address to the nation, President Clinton maintained a similar tone awakening Holocaust memories. His address was more dramatic and metaphorical than ever before, mobilizing numerous historical analogies and sensational images of the past in his attempt to explain the severity of the crisis and to secure public support.\textsuperscript{58} The President avoided describing the Serbian atrocities committed in Kosovo expressly as genocide. He often quoted testimony by Kosovar Albanian refugees.\textsuperscript{59}
Supplemented by his analogical references to the Holocaust, this rhetorical option furnished his remarks with an apt dramatic tone and helped him to legitimize NATO’s air strikes. The distance separating ethnic cleansing from genocide at the level of legality was thus obscured by the symbolic power of the Holocaust analogy at the level of legitimization. While the crime of ethnic cleansing may not be as severe as that of genocide once likened to the Holocaust, it has an equal or even greater legitimizing impact:

Though [Milosevic’s] ethnic cleansing is not the same as the ethnic extermination of the Holocaust, the two are related, both vicious, premeditated, systematic oppression fueled by religious and ethnic hatred. This campaign to drive the Kosovars from their land and to, indeed, erase their very identity is an affront to humanity and an attack not only on a people but on the dignity of all people.\textsuperscript{60}

In any case, this recognition of the difference in severity between ethnic cleansing and genocide (‘ethnic extermination’) did not prevent the President from often evoking the Holocaust analogy in the Kosovo case. To the contrary, this non-sameness was the very ground that allowed the employment of the metaphor and empowered its effectiveness. This rhetorical strategy was widely adopted by the White House during and after the Kosovo war.

Analogies to the Holocaust have an immediate appeal to most Jewish participants in U.S. policy circles. This by no means implies, of course, the absence of debate or dissent within the American Jewish community on the matter.\textsuperscript{61} Although, for evident reasons, no expressive equivalence was suggested between the two cases in terms of suffering, the Holocaust symbolism functioned as a way of legitimizing action.\textsuperscript{62} Indicative in this respect is the often quoted address by the Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel at the Seventh Millennium Evening at the White House in April 1999. Commenting on President Roosevelt’s inaction and failure to prevent the Jewish genocide on the eve of World War II, Wiesel noted the resonant U.S. answer to the horrors of Kosovo. Although Wiesel avoided equating the mass
crimes committed by the Milosevic regime with the Holocaust, he noted the devastating consequences of American ‘indifference’ as a reproach to this lesson of history. However, Wiesel’s remark on the uniqueness of the Holocaust did not prevent either the President or the First Lady, who addressed the keynote speaker, from repeating the historical parallelism. The case of Kosovo may not be a new Holocaust per se, President Clinton admitted, but the similarities are striking.

This reading of the Kosovo war through the Holocaust metanarrative not only facilitated the development of an analogical relationship between the two in terms of suffering and victimization, but also constructed an ideological basis for the future of Kosovo that the Americans were planning, once the war was over. When Clinton was awarded the Peace Garden Scroll and the Shalom Chaver Award for International Leadership by the Jewish community, he employed one of the first and most prophetic Holocaust analogies. Addressing himself to Yitzhak Rhabin’s wife, President Clinton noted:

Leah, you and Yitzhak lived the history of Israel together, from your marriage in the year of your nation’s birth, from the ashes of the Holocaust and the seeds of the Diaspora. You fought for independence and survival. You helped to build the enlightened, vibrant democratic society that Israel is today. And I want to say that we are very grateful to you for your sacrifices, for your contributions to help build an Israel that is strong and free, prosperous and at peace. We thank you. That is also America’s cause … in the former Yugoslavia, where we are determined to avoid in Kosovo a repeat of the terrible senseless bloodshed of Bosnia.

As we will see in the following section, even after the Kosovo war, the Holocaust metanarrative continued to function as an ideological basis for understanding future international crises, formulating American responses and legitimizing those responses both at home and abroad. The newly elected President George W. Bush, as well as numerous
Republican members of Congress, have persistently referred to Kosovo as a landmark in the long twentieth-century genealogy of evil that started with the Holocaust: Sudan, Armenia, Cambodia, Iraq, North Korea… The Holocaust narrative as developed during the wars in former Yugoslavia, from Bosnia to Kosovo, was so grave that it came to function as a persistent metatheory for understanding oncoming humanitarian crises, and legitimizing American intervention, long after the Dayton Accords.

The reduction of the Holocaust narrative to a universal and all-inclusive metanarrative of world politics is the outcome of a parallel and retroactive crisis at the levels of both ideology and structure. On the one hand, if the ‘anachronistic’ mechanisms of the UN Security Council proved to be an obstacle to the collective use of force in humanitarian crises, then the Holocaust meta-narrative offered a safe ideological recourse for a new, non-institutional legitimizing basis. On the other hand, if the post-Cold War concern of the West in the face of international humanitarian crises had been intensified by the Holocaust metanarrative, as well as by ideological processes such as the ‘Americanization’ of the Holocaust, then it was totally predictable that a new context for undertaking legitimate action had to be found elsewhere than with the UN, so that action would have to be undertaken in the name of a cosmopolitan responsibility supposedly held by the ‘civilized’ West in NATO or a ‘Coalition of the Willing’.

*The U.S. Legislative Branch of Government*

The Kosovo-Holocaust analogy first entered the Congressional Record in 1994 when Representative Gilman (R-NY) likened Milosevic’s tactics and objectives to Hitler’s and equated the expulsion of the Kosovar Albanians with the extermination of Jews. Up until 1997, the use of Kosovo-Holocaust analogies had been scarce, as the interest of the international community was still focused on Bosnia. By early spring 1998, however,
Holocaust analogies were already in use in the Senate calling for action in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{69} Disclosing the deep resonance of the Holocaust metanarrative in American society, Gordon Smith (R-OR) remarked, for example:

Growing up as a little boy, I have to tell you, I saw, with all Americans, reports and film footage from the Second World War where we saw a holocaust carried out in a previous decade. And I reacted with horror at things that I saw that humankind could do to one another. It just seemed to me, at a young age, that if we had the ability to stop holocausts in our time that we should… We supported our President. And we are maintaining peace in Bosnia. But right next door we are witnessing a holocaust unfold before our eyes, and we apparently are paralyzed in our efforts to respond.\textsuperscript{70}

In the House debates, historical analogies with World War II and the Holocaust soon played a key role in the argumentation to describe ‘a level of atrocity not seen since World War II … in the heart of Europe’, while condemning any indifference to the sufferings of the Kosovar Albanians.\textsuperscript{71} In the Senate debates, the Milosevic=Hitler equation seemed to be much clearer, since even for those reluctant to equate Milosevic expressly with Hitler, the similarities between their practices were thought to be so strong that they could hardly pass unnoticed.\textsuperscript{72} Although Jewish Members of Congress were particularly cautious not to equate the two cases fully, their references to the Holocaust were more numerous, stronger in symbolic content and more dramatic in tone.\textsuperscript{73}

In Senate debates during the same period, almost any questioning of the genocidal character of the crimes committed in Kosovo met with a fierce response from Joe Biden (D-DE).\textsuperscript{74} Central to Biden’s rhetoric was the case of the infamous manslaughter in Racak, evoking memories of Hitler’s tactics during World War II.\textsuperscript{75} The Milosevic=Hitler equation had already become commonsensical, leading to objections like those voiced by Representative Goodling (R-PA), who caustically noted: ‘That is mixing oranges and
apples.\textsuperscript{76} Despite these limited objections, however, Holocaust analogies dominated debates in the Senate and were employed by both Democrats and Republicans alike.\textsuperscript{77}

The Holocaust metanarrative soon functioned as the ideological platform for legitimizing NATO’s air strikes. The engagement of U.S. air forces was seen as a response to ‘a moral obligation, a mission and a mandate to prevent a modern day holocaust’. It fell within both the U.S. hegemonic role and NATO’s mission and was a clear message to the world that the United States was carrying out ‘the commitment that we had at the end of World War II that this will never happen again’.\textsuperscript{78} ‘Never again’ was no longer a vague promise, ‘again is happening right now. It is happening in Kosovo’.\textsuperscript{79}

Since 1998 in the Holocaust anniversary commemorations in the House of Representatives, the Kosovo case has been monopolizing interest, while the Kosovo-Holocaust analogy was further symbolically reinforced with similar references to the Armenian genocide. In 1999, developments in Kosovo eventually multiplied such analogies in terms of both number and symbolic import.\textsuperscript{80} Numerous speakers talked about the lessons of history that both political leaders and everyday people had to learn about humanity’s commitment to prevent a new Holocaust, the tragic consequences of inaction in the face of mass crimes and the ‘complicity’ of those who chose not to act.\textsuperscript{81} The case of the SS \textit{St Louis}, when the U.S. refused asylum to 937 Jewish passengers in 1939, was a constant point of reference in almost all the speeches, a reminder of American complicity in war crimes and of the nation’s current responsibility to react differently. Kosovo was thus seen as a second chance for redemption for U.S. inaction at the outset of World War II.\textsuperscript{82}

Upon return from his trip to Kosovo, Dick Durbin (D-IL) stated that his experience had helped him to appreciate the wish shared by all Jews to ‘return’ to a state of their own after the end of World War II. It was by then evident that the Kosovo-Holocaust analogy did not merely facilitate an understanding of the Kosovo tragedy, or the legitimization of the
international reaction to the ‘Albanian genocide’. The Holocaust metanarrative foretold and legitimized the recognition of an independent state in Kosovo by the United States:

I came away from that experience understanding better the Holocaust, understanding what must have been in the minds of so many Jewish people at the end of World War II who said: We need Israel because we have nowhere to go. Everywhere we go, we have been persecuted, we have been killed. Now the Kosovar refugees ask the same question: Where shall we go? Our policy is to allow them to return to Kosovo. That is where they want to be. That is where they should be.  

Jim Leach’s (R-IA) position is of particular interest, as it expresses perhaps the most composed reflection on American policy in Kosovo and highlights the role of metaphors in the formation of this policy. Commenting on the extensive and exclusive use of Hitlerite analogies, Leach’s critique moved beyond an obvious impertinence arising from the factual disproportionality of the cases. He noted the consequences of their distorting function, reducing available options for the United States to just one, unconditional victory. As he remarked, ‘history does not provide easy answers, either with regard to the meaning of contemporary events or to what actions should be taken in response to them’. Foreseeing the impact of strategic bombing on the perpetuation of interethnic hatred in Kosovo, Leach suggested that:

The line between a terrorist and a nationalist freedom fighter is narrow, as is the line between using force to stand up to atrocity and applying force in such a way that greater violence is precipitated … We simply have no idea how deep and how long the effects of our air strikes and the targets we have chosen will last … In the background of the predicament we are in is failed diplomacy.
Sam Gejdenson (D-CT), however, called to task both the House and the object of debate: ‘This is not academic discussion. If we pass this proposal, Mr. Milosevic will see a bright green light to continue the work of his role models, Hitler and Stalin.’

By early May 1999, Clinton’s policy in Kosovo had been already severely criticized as inadequate and less than proportionate for a savagery that the administration itself had already paralleled to the Holocaust. The option of inaction in the face of ‘unspeakable, imminent, and preventable violence’, of a slaughter unparalleled on European soil ‘since the Holocaust’, of ‘the most god-awful ethnic cleansing since Hitler’, was totally unacceptable. Referring to the mass waves of refugees fleeing to neighbouring countries, Chris Dodd (D-CT) employed the metaphor of the SS St. Louis in an interesting manner:

There are no ships at sea tonight, but I make the case that there is indeed a ‘St. Louis’.

It is called Albania; it is called Montenegro; it is called Macedonia … Our future, our children and generations to come, both here in America and around the world, will applaud the action of a Congress that has not lost sight of the lessons of history.

In his speech, Joe Biden (D-DE) made a blunt, albeit naïve point, admitting the role of Holocaust metaphors in strengthening public support and minimizing the political cost in case of American casualties:

It is difficult to explain to the American people how you would risk even one American life, or more than that, how you would be able to say I can assure you that Americans will die for something that hasn’t happened yet. How do you do that? I am sure somebody said, in 1935: If we go in after Hitler, it is going to cost 100 or 1,000 or 2,000 American lives to get the job done. I am sure Senators like the Presiding Officer and me sat there and said, ‘How am I going to go home and explain that to my folks? How can I go home and explain we are going to lose several thousand American lives to take out a guy they do not know anything about, who is no immediate threat to them
now, and all he is doing is beating up Jews and gypsies?’ Hard sell. That is where we are now.⁸⁸

Although the American media had already started questioning the use of Holocaust analogies, mostly on grounds of disproportionality, this questioning tended to call for a prompt solution, not through force, but through international justice,⁸⁹ presenting Milosevic’s trial at the ICTY as the new Nuremberg.⁹⁰ After all, the same conviction was shared by many ICTY officers.⁹¹

Meanwhile, the intensification of strategic bombing, the constant mistargetting of NATO’s ‘clever bombs’, the increasing ‘collateral damage’ and the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade had already started to shift public opinion at home and abroad against Clinton’s policies.⁹² Alarmed that the continuation of air strikes might lead to a reversed ‘victimization’ of the Serbian people, Clinton’s supporters in Congress gradually abandoned the older rhetoric of differentiating the guilt of the Serbian people from that of its leader. This time, Milosevic was described as a new Hitlerite ‘demagogue’, who mobilized the masses so as to succeed in his aims. As in the case of Germany at the end of World War II, the bombing of Serbia had to go on as a ‘necessary evil’, in order to break public support for Milosevic.⁹³

The Holocaust metanarrative remained the central ideological context for understanding the war and for legitimizing certain policy options in Kosovo. This metanarrative had impacts that extended to the institutionalization and management of the Holocaust memory in museums and memorials. It is indicative that after the return of a Congressional mission to the Balkans in June 1999, Congress organized a reception for junior House members hosted at the Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington. The guests were welcomed by the President of the Holocaust Council and Holocaust survivor Miles Lerman:

It is here where you will fully comprehend that the Holocaust did not begin in Auschwitz or in any of the death camps. It began when lawmakers lacked the stamina
to speak out against the constantly escalating evils. It is here where it will become clear to you what our role in Kosovo must be … It is here where you will be able to fortify your inner strengths, to stick to your convictions and speak your mind in your legislative deliberations, even at times when your opinion may not be most popular. It will strengthen your determination to stand alone, if need be, and speak truth to power.\textsuperscript{94}

Even after the end of the war, the Holocaust metanarrative as shaped during the Kosovo war dominated the rhetoric of the U.S. legislative body, now functioning as (a) an ideological lens for reading past and future U.S. foreign policy, (b) a guideline for decision making, and (c) an ethical basis for evaluating political leadership and its choices.\textsuperscript{95} In this respect, the interest of past and current American presidents in human rights issues and their sensitivity to the historical lessons of the Holocaust were now functioning as two fundamental axiological criteria for policy evaluation.\textsuperscript{96}

The Kosovo-Holocaust analogy kept appearing in Congressional rhetoric even after 1999. The impact of the representation of the Kosovo horrors was so strong on both the members of Congress and the American people that Kosovo itself soon came to function as an emblematic case of human suffering, almost equal to the Holocaust.\textsuperscript{97} As to the Kosovo-Holocaust analogy, it was now used to support arguments in debates concerning the presence of U.S. forces in the Balkans,\textsuperscript{98} or the American contribution to the UN peacekeeping forces.\textsuperscript{99} The more such metaphors persisted, the more intense was the critique of their applicability in the Kosovo case. On the one hand, this critique aimed to expose the fallacies of Clinton’s policies and rhetoric on Kosovo.\textsuperscript{100} On the other hand, those confident about the applicability of these analogies kept employing them either to praise Clinton’s choices, or to criticize the delayed U.S. reaction.\textsuperscript{101}
In most cases, the Kosovo-Holocaust analogy continued to function as an ideological set of tools for either (a) elevating a new morality superior to the international legality set by the UN Charter, or (b) legitimizing the exclusive jurisdiction of American courts over war crimes committed by members of the U.S. armed forces during operations in Kosovo. In both cases, the result was the same.102

In 2000, the Kosovo-Holocaust analogy continued to monopolize congressional interest during the anniversary commemorations of the Armenian genocide103 and the Holocaust.104 Whereas in similar events in 1999 the analogy was aimed at elevating the Kosovo case to a level equal or similar to that of the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide, those first speeches in the post-Kosovo era referred to the Kosovo tragedy as an already indispensable part of a genealogy of evil that started with the Armenian genocide, reached its peak with the Holocaust and continued in the new millennium as a persistent reminder of the consequences of inaction.105 The significance of such speeches and events can be traced to the fact that with the institutionalization of the memory of those crimes, there was also an institutionalization of the American response as just and legitimate. The educational function was admittedly strong. Indeed, one could hardly expect to trace the basic lines of American foreign policy in such anniversary speeches and events, especially since normally most of the speakers either lacked Congressional experience or were personally invested in the event because of religion or origin. A more careful reading, though, of such texts discloses not only an archaeology of mass crimes and of respective reaction or inaction, but also the development of a latent agenda for future U.S. humanitarian interventions.106

In ensuing years the use of the Kosovo-Holocaust analogy has gradually declined. Nevertheless, it continues to appear in the Congressional Record as an indispensable element of the Holocaust metanarrative, a symbolic element with multiple ideological functions. These functions were fully disclosed in two episodes, and can be found among many others,
of American foreign policy. First, in the case of Sudan, the Kosovo-Holocaust analogy was
drawn as a lesson of history both on the failure of peace-keeping missions to stop mass
crimes, and on the necessity of assuming more drastic measures. For example, the option of
deploying ‘blue helmets’ or peacekeepers in Sudan was treated as a synonym for indifference
and inaction, typical of past appeasement policies.\textsuperscript{107}

Even more interesting is the use of the Kosovo-Holocaust analogy during the Iraq war
in the wider context of the so-called ‘Global War on Terror’ inaugurated by the newly elected
President George W. Bush. The new ‘monster’, the new ‘maniac’ was in fact an old
acquaintance, Saddam Hussein. The ‘lessons of history’, this time including Kosovo, once
again called for a resort to force. The demonization and ‘Nazification’ of Saddam Hussein
constitutes a separate chapter of U.S. foreign policy and a separate theme in need of further
analysis. What interests us here, however, is the impact of the Kosovo-Holocaust analogy on
how views about Iraq were formed in Congress at the beginning of the new millennium. To
the Saddam-Hitler equation, already popular in the 1990s, there was added the symbolic
cargo of the Kosovo case. Saddam was not simply a ‘brutal dictator’, but a living threat to
U.S. security, the defense of which should not be placed in the hands of ‘unaccountable
bureaucrats’ at the UN.\textsuperscript{108}

If the ethnic cleansing of the Kosovar Albanians was reason enough to legitimize U.S.
intervention, then the mass violations of human rights and atrocities committed by Saddam,
along with the permanent threat to U.S. security posed by his alleged possession of nuclear
and other weapons of mass destruction, not only legitimized but actually demanded U.S.
intervention.\textsuperscript{109} During Congressional debates on Iraq, Curt Weldon (R-PA) referred to
exaggeration and distortion concerning developments in Kosovo that facilitated and
legitimized intervention.\textsuperscript{110} However, given the later disclosure of the ‘intelligence failure’ in
Iraq, Weldon’s speech seems now to foreshadow a critique of Bush’s policy in Iraq. This
rhetoric remained very popular, especially among Republicans, during the ensuing years. As to the Holocaust, it had already started to dominate debates on up-to-date issues, such as the turbulent elections in Zimbabwe and the possibility of economic sanctions against North Korea. The new Hitler was now Kim Yong-Il, the new Auschwitz was now the infamous Camp 22.

Conclusion

In this article I have traced the extensive employment of metaphors and historical analogies in official U.S. discourse connecting the case of Kosovo with that of the Holocaust. Instead of examining the accuracy or otherwise of these analogies, I focused on the ideological functions of the collective imaginary linked to these metaphors. This imaginary was treated as an all-inclusive narrative, a metanarrative for understanding the Kosovo war and ethically evaluating the U.S. response. As we have seen, the Holocaust metanarrative in the Kosovo case pertained to three key ideological functions: integration, legitimization, and distortion, which can be summarized as follows.

First, by virtue of its integrating function, the Holocaust metanarrative strengthened Congressional support for President Clinton’s policy in Kosovo, securing the widest possible consensus in decision making in both the Senate and the House on a crisis where no vital U.S. interest was thought to be at stake. At the same time, it reinforced necessary social integration at home, especially at the moment when the decisions that were reached endangered the lives of U.S. soldiers and increased spending for these humanitarian purposes. This integrating function further helped create a common ground for dialogue, consensus, and concerted action with European allies in NATO, as well as internationally.

Second, by virtue of its legitimizing function, the Holocaust metanarrative facilitated the legitimization of intervention on a new ethical basis, a new global morality extending
beyond the context of legitimacy set by the UN Charter and international law. Between the claim to and the belief in legitimacy involved in this legitimization process, there existed a gap that needed to be filled. The Holocaust ideology provided the added value necessary to turn this claim into a belief. This belief was in the legitimacy of the intervention, understood as the fulfillment of a moral obligation assumed after the end of World War II by the international community not to allow, ‘ever again’, the repetition of the Holocaust. Furthermore, by virtue of its legitimizing function, the Holocaust metanarrative provided added value for the necessity of the war, thus reducing the political cost of the policies adopted. Because of this legitimizing function, for example, the two American pilots who lost their lives during the war, the only NATO losses according to official reports, were not simply two soldiers killed away from the battlefield in an accident caused by some mechanical damage, in a distant land, in a pointless or unjust war, where no vital U.S. interest was at stake. The bodies of the soldiers returned home, instead, as the bodies of two honored heroes, who had given their lives in a sacred humanitarian mission to prevent a new Holocaust.

It is only when the above functions of integration and legitimization are disclosed that one can fully discern the third, distorting function of the Holocaust metanarrative, that is, an understanding of the war through the oversimplified differentiation of the parties involved as divided between evil perpetrators and innocent victims. The outcome of this function was the victimization of the Kosovar Albanians through their equation with the innocent victims of the Holocaust and through the Nazification of the Serbs and Milosevic. Hence, by noting this distorting function, my analysis moves beyond strategies of managing deceit in a context of propaganda. To the contrary, it concerns the misinterpretation of the Kosovo crisis, resulting in (a) a substantive limitation of the available policy options for the United States (unconditional victory, no negotiated settlement with Milosevic), as well as (b) an inability to
understand the complexity and historicity of interethnic conflict in the region. In other words, the Holocaust meta-narrative contributed to the schematization and rationalization of the conflict in terms other than those corresponding to its specificities. The end result of this distortion was the pursuit of postwar solutions that eventually allowed, intensified and reproduced estrangement between the conflicting communities. This, of course, further distances us from the possibility of a commonly accepted framework for inter-communal dialogue and reconciliation.

Notes

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Due to the length limitations applied, however, the references used here are not exhaustive.


Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, op. cit., p. 135.

Ibid., pp. 162-166.


By ‘literal’ Ricoeur does not refer to a real, proper, or originary sense of the word but to the one that is ‘lexicalized’, that is simply current, ‘usual’. Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, op. cit., pp. 199, 291.

By combining the (non-productive) seeing-as with the (productive) saying-as, metaphors open up new worlds of signification and provide new projects of action. Ricoeur, ‘Metaphor and the central problem of hermeneutics’, op. cit., p. 181.
Ricoeur acknowledges a specific strategy to metaphorical discourse in the relation between language and reality: ‘[M]etaphor not only shatters the previous structures of our language, but also the previous structures of what we call reality. When we ask whether metaphorical language teaches reality, we presuppose that we already know what reality is. But if we assume that metaphor redescribes reality, we must then assume that this reality as redescribed is itself novel reality. My conclusion is that the strategy of discourse implied in metaphorical language is … to shatter and to increase our sense of reality by shattering and increasing our language. … With metaphor we experience the metamorphosis of both language and reality’. Paul Ricoeur, ‘Creativity in language: word, polysemy, metaphor’, in Charles E. Reagan and David Stewart (eds), The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: An Anthology of His Work, Beacon Press, Boston, MA, 1978, pp. 132-133.

Ricoeur, Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, op. cit., p. 311.

Ibid., pp. 172-173.


Ricoeur, Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, op. cit., p. 10.

Ibid., p. 266.

Thomas Cushman and Stjepan G. Mestrovic (eds), This Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia, New York University Press, New York, 1996.


Secretary Albright, ‘Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’, 20 April 1999; ‘Statement before the House International Relations Committee’, 21 April 1999.


Secretary Albright, ‘Remarks and Q&A session at the Brookings Institution’, 6 April 1999.

Secretary Albright, ‘Pre-taped video remarks for the American Jewish Committee dinner’, 6 May 1999.
51 Cited by Tom Lantos (D-CA) in 145 Cong. Rec. E2352 (November 11, 1999).

52 See Kenneth M. Jensen and David Wurmser (eds), The Meaning of Munich Fifty Years Later, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, 1990.


56 President Clinton, ‘The President’s news conference with President Vaclav Havel of the Czech Republic’, 16 September 1998.

57 President Clinton, ‘Remarks at the legislative convention of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees’, 23 March 1999.

58 President Clinton, ‘Address to the nation on airstrikes against Serbian targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)’, 24 March 1999.


60 President Clinton, ‘Remarks to the veterans of foreign wars of the United States at Fort McNair, Maryland’, 13 May 1999.


63 Cited in President Clinton, ‘Remarks at the seventh Millennium Evening at the White House’, 12 April 1999.

64 Ibid.

65 This discourse of victimization through Holocaust analogies has, of course, a long ancestry in former Yugoslavia, underpinning the antagonism between conflicting memories and representations of violence in the historical consciousness and the political identities of ethno-national groups. See Paul B. Gordiejew, ‘Playing with Jews in the fields of nations: symbolic contests in the Former Yugoslavia’, Social Identities, 12(3), 2006, pp. 377-400.

Similar analogies were later drawn by President George W. Bush. President Bush, ‘Address at Warsaw University’, 15 June 2001; ‘The President’s radio address’, 15 March 2003.

140 Cong. Rec. E737 (April 21, 1994).


145 Cong. Rec. H5033, 5035 (June 29, 1999).


145 Cong. Rec. S8256 (July 12, 1999).


148 Cong. Rec. H7392 (October 9, 2002).


152 Cong. Rec. S6233 (June 21, 2006).


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