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|Title:||International Environmental Agreements—The Role of Foresight|
Sartzetakis, Eftichios S.
|Source:||Environmental and Resource Economics|
|Abstract:||The present paper attempts to bridge the gap between the cooperative and the non-cooperative approach employed to examine the size of stable coalitions, formed to address global environmental problems. We do so by endowing countries with foresightedness, that is, by endogenizing the reaction of the coalition’s members to a deviation by one member. We assume that when a country contemplates withdrawing or joining an agreement, it takes into account the reactions of other countries ignited by its own actions. We identify conditions under which there always exists a unique set of farsighted stable IEAs. The new farsighted IEAs can be much larger than those some of the previous models supported but are not always Pareto efficient.|
|Appears in Collections:||Department of Economics |
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