Παρακαλώ χρησιμοποιήστε αυτό το αναγνωριστικό για να παραπέμψετε ή να δημιουργήσετε σύνδεσμο προς αυτό το τεκμήριο:
https://ruomo.lib.uom.gr/handle/7000/844
Πλήρης εγγραφή μεταδεδομένων
Πεδίο DC | Τιμή | Γλώσσα |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Strantza, Stefania | - |
dc.contributor.author | Sartzetakis, Eftichios S. | - |
dc.contributor.author | Diamantoudi, Effrosyni | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-11-25T10:49:42Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-11-25T10:49:42Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | - |
dc.identifier | 10.1561/102.00000096 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 1944-012X | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 1944-0138 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://doi.org/10.1561/102.00000096 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://ruomo.lib.uom.gr/handle/7000/844 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper examines the effect of designing international agreements that jointly determine environmental and trade policies on the participation level and aggregate welfare. This paper builds on the non-cooperative game approach of the International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) literature extending the basic model by introducing firms that trade in a global market. Countries choose the level of a tax on emissions and a tariff on imports: signatories enjoy tariff-free trade among themselves, impose a tariff to nonsignatories and a common emissions tax; nonsignatories levy a tariff on imports and a tax on domestic emissions. Resorting to numerical simulations, the paper shows increased participation to the joint agreement of around 70% of the total number of countries. These coalitions are not only much larger than the two-country coalition derived in the case without trade, but they also achieve substantial welfare improvements of around 60% of the welfare improvement the grand coalition provides over the coalition of two. The paper presents a series of numerical simulations to confirm the robustness of these results to changes in the parameters values. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.source | Strategic Behavior and the Environment | en_US |
dc.subject | FRASCATI::Social sciences::Economics and Business::Economics | en_US |
dc.subject | FRASCATI::Social sciences::Economics and Business::Economics | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Environmental agreements | en_US |
dc.subject.other | International trade | en_US |
dc.title | International Environmental Agreements and Trading Blocks — Can Issue Linkage Enhance Cooperation? | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.contributor.department | Τμήμα Οικονομικών Επιστημών | en_US |
local.identifier.volume | 8 | en_US |
local.identifier.issue | 3 | en_US |
local.identifier.firstpage | 269 | en_US |
local.identifier.lastpage | 310 | en_US |
Εμφανίζεται στις Συλλογές: | Τμήμα Οικονομικών Επιστημών |
Αρχεία σε αυτό το Τεκμήριο:
Αρχείο | Περιγραφή | Μέγεθος | Μορφότυπος | |
---|---|---|---|---|
sbe-096 - revised proofs.pdf | 917,68 kB | Adobe PDF | Προβολή/Ανοιγμα |
Τα τεκμήρια στο Αποθετήριο προστατεύονται από πνευματικά δικαιώματα, εκτός αν αναφέρεται κάτι διαφορετικό.